Conversational AI has a fundamental flaw as a knowledge interface: sycophantic chatbots induce epistemic entrenchment and delusional belief spirals even in rational agents. We propose the problem does not stem from the AI model, rooted instead in a systemic consequence of the paradigm shift from user-driven knowledge search to users and agents engaged in strategic, repeated-play communication. We formalize the problem as a Crawford-Sobel cheap talk game, where costless user signals induce a pooling equilibrium. Agents optimized for user satisfaction produce sycophantic strategies that provide identical reinforcement across user types with opposite epistemic incentives: exploratory Growth-seekers'' ($θ_G$) and confirmatory Validation-seekers'' (θV). Under repeated play, this identification failure creates a coordination trap -- analogous to a Prisoner's Dilemma -- where locally rational feedback loops drive users toward pathologically certain false beliefs. We propose an inference-time mechanism design intervention called an Epistemic Mediator that breaks this pooling equilibrium by introducing a costly signal (epistemic friction), forcing type revelation based on users' asymmetric cognitive costs for processing resistance. A key contribution is Belief Versioning, a git-inspired epistemic meta-memory system that stores healthy beliefs and rollbacks when validation-seeking resistance is detected. In simulation, this intervention achieves a separating equilibrium achieving a 48× differential in spiral rates while passing a learning preservation criterion), evidence that epistemic safety in AI is fundamentally a problem of strategic information environment design rather than simple model alignment.
AI chatbots can be "sycophantic," or overly agreeable and flattering toward users. Sycophantic AI has been shown to entrench attitudes, yet users frequently fail to recognize it (a phenomenon we call "sycophancy blindness"). We tested whether increasing users' awareness of sycophancy protects them from its harmful effects in two preregistered experiments (n = 1,590). In the first, participants received a brief written warning about sycophancy before conversing with a sycophantic chatbot. In the second, participants watched a video of a sycophantic AI validating several other users, including users on opposite sides of the same conflict, before interacting with it themselves. Both interventions changed how participants evaluated the AI. The warning reduced the AI's perceived objectivity, and the video reduced enjoyment of the AI --- an effect mediated by the reduced belief that its validation was uniquely earned. We then pooled our experiments with two prior studies of sycophancy awareness interventions (six interventions total, n = 3,982). The pattern across experiments was consistent: while the interventions made the sycophantic AI appear less objective and trustworthy, none reduced its persuasiveness. These results suggest that individual-level interventions, such as warning labels or AI literacy, may not be enough to protect users from AI harms.
We systematically investigate all 25 public ARC-AGI-3 games and find that every one is reachable through non-intelligent strategies: 10 in a single blind step, 5 after one probing action, 1 via repeated ACTION1 presses, 1 via diverse exploration, and 8 via single repeated actions with sufficient budget (50-200 steps). A library-level null-coordinate vulnerability additionally bypasses 18 games in 1 step. This benchmark critique implies the public evaluation set cannot discriminate intelligent exploration from trivial heuristics - the private 55-game evaluation is the only genuine intelligence test. Against this backdrop, we present AERA (Adaptive Epistemic Reasoning Agent), a three-phase (EXPLORE / VERIFY / PLAN) agent achieving RHAE=0.2116 (4/25 solved) on these 25 games with Qwen2.5-0.5B, while random and no-explore baselines score 0.0000. We formalise AERA through a Speed--Depth trade-off framework: under a convexity assumption (proved for a class of environments in the Appendix), RHAE's quadratic form emerges as a second-order penalty for deviating from the Pareto frontier between action efficiency and information gain. Contributions: (i) a benchmark validity analysis showing that current interactive reasoning benchmarks fail to measure the exploration they claim to require, and (ii) the EXPLORE-before-PLAN framework and model-capability x exploration interaction. The linked code track entry achieves RHAE=0.30 on the full 55-game private evaluation. Code: CC0.
As large language models are deployed as autonomous agents that communicate intentions before acting, a critical safety question is whether agents that publicly commit to actions will honor those commitments. We place LLM agents in repeated n-player games with a three-stage protocol that separates private intent, public announcement, and final action, allowing us to identify whether each deviation from a stated announcement was already planned during private deliberation. Evaluating three frontier models across six games in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups over 10 rounds, we report two findings. First, when agents deviate from their announcements, the deviation is predominantly already stated in their private plan (exceeding 90% in the highest-deception conditions), yet this is not a fixed model property: the same model ranges from perfect honesty to near-total deviation across games. Second, different models interpret announcements incompatibly, some as binding commitments and others as cheap talk, producing payoff gaps that emerge in Round~0 and persist across all 10 rounds. Systems that combine models from different providers therefore cannot assume shared announcement semantics and require empirical testing of model interactions before deployment.
Jerick Shi, Terry Jingcheng Zhang, Bernhard Schölkopf +2