cs.CLMay 9, 2026

GAMBIT: A Three-Mode Benchmark for Adversarial Robustness in Multi-Agent LLM Collectives

Authors: Alexandre Le MercierChris DevelderThomas Demeester

Organizations: IDLab–T2K, Ghent University–imec

Abstract

In multi-agent systems (MAS), a single deceptive agent can nullify all gains of an agentic AI collective and evade deployed defenses. However, existing adversarial studies on MAS target only shallow tasks and do not consider adaptive adversaries, which evolve their strategies to evade the very detectors trained to catch them. To address that gap, we introduce GAMBIT, a benchmark with three evaluation modes and two independent scores for evaluating imposter detectors: the first two modes measure zero-shot detection under increasing distribution shift, and a third recalibration mode measures how quickly a detector adapts to novel attacks from just 20 labeled examples. The benchmark comes with a dataset of 27,804 labeled instances spanning 240 co-evolved imposter strategies. Our contributions are threefold: (1) Using chess as a substrate deep reasoning problem and Gemini 3.1 Pro for agents, we release GAMBIT and its dataset to evaluate imposter detectors under realistic constraints against a stealthy adaptive imposter; (2) We introduce an adaptive imposter agent based on an efficient evolutionary framework, generalizable beyond chess, that collapses collective task performance while remaining essentially undetectable (50.5% F1-score with a Gemini-based detector); (3) We show that zero-shot evaluation can be highly misleading for adaptive adversaries: two detectors with near-identical zero-shot scores differ by 8x on few-shot adaptation, while the meta-learned variant converges 20x faster, a gap only visible in the recalibration mode. Altogether, GAMBIT provides the first multi-agent benchmark where adversarial attacks and defenses co-evolve, with an imposter framework generalizable beyond our use case, and promising techniques for fast recalibration in a rapidly evolving adversarial system. Code and data: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/gambit.

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