Beyond Static Evaluation: Co-Evolutionary Mechanisms for LLM-Driven Strategy Evolution in Adversarial Games

Automated red-team attacks and blue-team defenses for large language models (LLMs) are advancing quickly. However, attackers and defenders are built and tested in isolation, and the resulting scores are hard to trust. To tackle this, we present ACEA (Adversarial Co-Evolution Arena), a platform that connects a pluggable red-team adapter and a pluggable blue-team adapter to a shared target LLM and scores their attack and defense rates with an LLM judge. ACEA contributes four components. First, a pluggable, model-agnostic arena. Any red or blue project connects over a minimal HTTP protocol, which we call the ACEA Standard Adapter Protocol (ASAP). It can be written in any language, and a project that exposes nothing but the protocol is a full participant. Second, an evaluation methodology built for adversarial rounds. Seeding the target with canonical secrets gives verifiable ground truth that separates real leakage from hallucination. We also send each attack to the target even when the defense blocks it, which measures the attack's raw potency independently of whether it was stopped. Together these yield a per-round decomposition of attack strength and defense effectiveness. Third, a real-time, game-style visualization with a detailed end-of-battle report that localizes each failure. The evaluation thus becomes an actionable signal for improving a red or blue project. Fourth, an optional in-context improvement loop that turns each round's outcome into advisory hints for the next. An adapter can then adapt across rounds without keeping state, provided it reads the hints. We describe the design of ACEA and the metrics through which red and blue teams are scored head to head.

In multi-agent systems (MAS), a single deceptive agent can nullify all gains of an agentic AI collective and evade deployed defenses. However, existing adversarial studies on MAS target only shallow tasks and do not consider adaptive adversaries, which evolve their strategies to evade the very detectors trained to catch them. To address that gap, we introduce GAMBIT, a benchmark with three evaluation modes and two independent scores for evaluating imposter detectors: the first two modes measure zero-shot detection under increasing distribution shift, and a third recalibration mode measures how quickly a detector adapts to novel attacks from just 20 labeled examples. The benchmark comes with a dataset of 27,804 labeled instances spanning 240 co-evolved imposter strategies. Our contributions are threefold: (1) Using chess as a substrate deep reasoning problem and Gemini 3.1 Pro for agents, we release GAMBIT and its dataset to evaluate imposter detectors under realistic constraints against a stealthy adaptive imposter; (2) We introduce an adaptive imposter agent based on an efficient evolutionary framework, generalizable beyond chess, that collapses collective task performance while remaining essentially undetectable (50.5% F1-score with a Gemini-based detector); (3) We show that zero-shot evaluation can be highly misleading for adaptive adversaries: two detectors with near-identical zero-shot scores differ by 8x on few-shot adaptation, while the meta-learned variant converges 20x faster, a gap only visible in the recalibration mode. Altogether, GAMBIT provides the first multi-agent benchmark where adversarial attacks and defenses co-evolve, with an imposter framework generalizable beyond our use case, and promising techniques for fast recalibration in a rapidly evolving adversarial system. Code and data: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/gambit.

As large language models grow increasingly capable, concerns about their safe deployment have intensified. While numerous alignment strategies aim to restrict harmful behavior, these defenses can still be circumvented through carefully designed adversarial prompts. In this work, we introduce a theoretical framework that formalizes a game between an attacker and a defender. Within this framework, we design a theoretical best-response attack strategy and show that it is closely related to many existing adversarial prompting methods. We further analyze the resulting game, characterize its equilibria, and reveal inherent advantages for the attacker. Drawing on our theoretical analysis, we also derive a provably optimal defense strategy. Empirically, we evaluate a practical instantiation of the theoretically optimal attack and observe stronger performance relative to existing adversarial prompting approaches in diverse settings encompassing different LLMs and benchmarks.