A Cognitively Grounded Bayesian Framework for Misinformation Susceptibility

Misalignment can change how information moves from an AI agent to a human user. We model this as an information advantage: the AI agent observes the world state, while the human receiver only knows a prior and must act after seeing the agent's signal. A strategic AI sender may withhold evidence or garble information in order to steer the human's decision. We ask how much useful information can still reach the human when the AI optimizes a misaligned objective. We study a Bayesian persuasion model in which the world state is a bit string, the human receiver wants to guess the bits correctly, and a single AI sender wants the receiver to guess as many bits as possible as $1$. For a prior $μ$, let $R_0(μ)$ be the receiver's utility from using only the prior, and let $R_{\max}(μ)$ be the largest receiver utility among signaling schemes that are optimal for the sender. We prove $R_{\max}(μ)/R_0(μ)\leq 3/2$. This bound improves for priors close to the independent product prior with the same marginals: if $μ(x)\geq (1-η)π_μ(x)$ for every state $x$, then $R_{\max}(μ)\leq R_0(μ)+ηn$. We also give a six-bit prior for which $R_{\max}(μ)/R_0(μ)=39/31>5/4$, so no universal $5/4$ bound is possible.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be persuasive across a variety of contexts. But it remains unclear whether this persuasive power advantages accuracy, or if bad actors can just as easily use LLMs to promote misbeliefs. Here, we investigate this question across four experiments in which participants (N = 3996 Americans) discussed a conspiracy theory they were uncertain about with an LLM we instructed to either argue against ("debunking") or for ("bunking") that conspiracy. Across several frontier models (with standard guardrails but prompted to allow lying), we did not find consistent evidence of a truth advantage: the LLMs were able to both substantially increase and decrease average conspiracy belief, and participants in the bunking condition rated the LLM as more informative and collaborative, and reported greater trust in AI, than those who were in the debunking condition. More encouragingly, however, debunking induced more large changes in belief, and subsequent corrections were able to reverse the bunking effect. Furthermore, simply prompting the model to only provide accurate information dramatically reduced bunking effectiveness, and one powerful frontier model (GPT 5.2) almost entirely refused to promote conspiracies, suggesting that it is possible for the right guardrails to favor accurate beliefs. Finally, we did find a stark truth asymmetry in the context of information sharing: debunking had a large positive impact on mock social media posts composed by participants, while bunking had little effect. Overall, our findings show that people are not inherently less susceptible to AI that misleads than to AI that informs, but that potential technical solutions exist to mitigate this risk.

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender can influence the behavior of a receiver through strategic information disclosure. Standard models assume the sender is the receiver's only source of information, yet in many applications receivers also consult external sources the sender can neither observe nor control. We study an online Bayesian persuasion problem in which a binary-action receiver has access to a fixed signaling scheme that is unknown to the sender. Over $T$ rounds, the sender commits to a signaling scheme and sends a signal; the receiver combines it with its private signal and acts, while the sender observes only the action. We design a learning algorithm that achieves regret $\widetilde{O}(T^{3/4})$ relative to the optimal scheme of a sender who knows the private signaling scheme of the receiver, with polynomial dependence on the sizes of the state space and the receiver's signal alphabet. Our key insight is reducing the problem of learning the exponentially large belief-space partitioning induced by the private scheme to a one-dimensional change-point detection problem.