cs.AIMay 12, 2026

Why Conclusions Diverge from the Same Observations: Formalizing World-Model Non-Identifiability via an Inference

Authors: Toru Takahashi

Organizations: Human Informatics and Systems Laboratory, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan · Linked Open Data Initiative, NPO, Tokyo, Japan · Keio Research Institute at SFC, Fujisawa, Japan · Stroly Inc., Kyoto, Japan

Abstract

When people share the same documents and observations yet reach different conclusions, the disagreement often shifts into a judgment that the other party is cognitively defective, irrational, or acting in bad faith. This paper argues that such divergence is better described as a form of non-identifiability inherent in inference and learning, rather than as a defect of the other party. We organize the phenomenon into two levels: (i) θθ-level non-identifiability, where conclusions diverge under the same world model WW because inference settings differ; and (ii) WW-level non-identifiability, where repeated use of an inference setting θθ biases data exposure and update rules, causing the learned world model WW itself to diverge. We introduce an inference profile θ=(R,E,S,D)θ= (R, E, S, D), consisting of Reference, Exploration, Stabilization, and Horizon, and show how outputs can split even for the same observation oo and the same WW. We further explain why disagreements tend to project onto a small number of bases -- abstract versus concrete, externalizability, and order versus freedom -- as a consequence of general constraints on learning systems: computational, observational, and coordination constraints. Finally, we relate the framework to deep representation learning, including representation hierarchy, latent-state estimation, and regularization-exploration trade-offs, and illustrate the framework through a case study on AI regulation debates.

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