Toward AI That Understands Self and Others: A World-Model Theory of Cognitive Diversity and Alignment

When people share the same documents and observations yet reach different conclusions, the disagreement often shifts into a judgment that the other party is cognitively defective, irrational, or acting in bad faith. This paper argues that such divergence is better described as a form of non-identifiability inherent in inference and learning, rather than as a defect of the other party. We organize the phenomenon into two levels: (i) $θ$-level non-identifiability, where conclusions diverge under the same world model $W$ because inference settings differ; and (ii) $W$-level non-identifiability, where repeated use of an inference setting $θ$ biases data exposure and update rules, causing the learned world model $W$ itself to diverge. We introduce an inference profile $θ= (R, E, S, D)$, consisting of Reference, Exploration, Stabilization, and Horizon, and show how outputs can split even for the same observation $o$ and the same $W$. We further explain why disagreements tend to project onto a small number of bases -- abstract versus concrete, externalizability, and order versus freedom -- as a consequence of general constraints on learning systems: computational, observational, and coordination constraints. Finally, we relate the framework to deep representation learning, including representation hierarchy, latent-state estimation, and regularization-exploration trade-offs, and illustrate the framework through a case study on AI regulation debates.

This report of world models distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost human-like cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles from human and machine cognition theory. In moving towards human-like world models we present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions (i.e., memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and metacognition) and identify gaps in existing research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and metacognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions to address these gaps informed by active inference and global workspace theory. We also introduce epistemic world models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied to video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

World models, internal simulators that learn the structure and dynamics of an environment, have emerged as a central paradigm in the pursuit of artificial general intelligence, enabling agents to predict, plan, and reason within learned representations. Despite rapid progress across reinforcement learning, robotics, autonomous driving, and video generation, the field lacks a unified framework integrating its diverse architectural choices, training methods, reasoning mechanisms, and application settings. This survey addresses that gap with a multi-axis taxonomy organized along four dimensions: (i) architecture, encompassing representation format, dynamics formulation, input modality, learning paradigm, and downstream application; (ii) methodological family, including state-space and recurrent approaches, transformer-based models, diffusion-based generators, physics-informed networks, and language-augmented multimodal systems; (iii) reasoning strategy, covering imagination-based planning, latent policy learning, counterfactual reasoning, and planning under uncertainty; and (iv) application domain, spanning robotics, autonomous driving, video prediction, multimodal agents, reinforcement learning, scientific modeling, medical imaging, educational measurement, and business and finance. Tracing the field from early cognitive-science foundations to milestone systems such as PlaNet, the Dreamer family, MuZero, Sora, Cosmos, and Genie, we examine how these dimensions interact and highlight the recent convergence of chain-of-thought reasoning with world-model imagination. We review evaluation protocols and benchmarks, identify persistent challenges such as compounding prediction errors, sim-to-real transfer, and fragmented evaluation, and outline future directions toward unified multimodal world models, foundation-scale interactive simulators, and safe deployment in safety-critical domains.