Estimated Dynamic Equilibrium Model: Supply and Demand as a Sample Path of a Stochastic Process

Evolutionary agent-based markets (ABMs) couple several mechanisms -- who reproduces, how price forms, how biased the agents are, how consensus propagates -- yet these are usually fixed by convention, so it is unclear which mechanism controls which emergent property. In a coevolving, endogenous-price simulator with 120 heterogeneous behavioral agents, we make four mechanisms pluggable and run matched 3x20-seed interventions. We find the levers are largely separable. (1) Selection -> diversity: a Quality-Diversity (QD/MAP-Elites) operator robustly raises strategy-mix entropy over truncation top-k (paired Delta entropy +0.27 to +1.12 bits; sign-test p<0.001; CIs exclude 0) and sustains more strategy cycling (strongest in crisis: Delta=+0.070, p=0.0004). (2) Selection does not improve realism: even a per-agent realism reward that provably steers selection does not raise 5-fact realism (Delta_5=-0.11,-0.08,+0.03; not significant). (3) Microstructure -> realism: enabling reflexive price feedback does raise realism (Delta_5=+0.13,+0.20,+0.20; crisis/bull p<0.05, all CIs positive). (4) Behavior -> fragility: amplifying behavioral bias raises a genomic fragility proxy (Delta=+10.5,+11.1,+14.4; bull p<0.001, all CIs positive) while leaving realism flat. The remaining mechanism -- consensus network topology -- shows no robust effect (honest null). The contribution is a decomposition: in these single-mechanism sweeps the mechanisms behave as approximately distinct control knobs over diversity, realism, and fragility.

Digital marketplaces processing billions of dollars annually represent critical infrastructure in sociotechnical ecosystems, yet their performance optimization lacks principled measurement frameworks that can inform algorithmic governance decisions regarding market efficiency and fairness from complex market data. By looking at orderbook data from double auction markets alone, because bids and asks do not represent true maximum willingnesses to buy and true minimum willingnesses to sell, there is little an economist can say about the market's actual performance in terms of allocative efficiency. We turn to experimental data to address this issue, `inverting' the standard induced value approach of double auction experiments. Our aim is to predict key market features relevant to market efficiency, particularly allocative efficiency, using orderbook data only -- specifically bids, asks and price realizations, but not the induced reservation values -- as early as possible. Since there is no established model of strategically optimal behavior in these markets, and because orderbook data is highly unstructured, non-stationary and non-linear, we propose quantile-based normalization techniques that help us build general predictive models. We develop and train several models, including linear regressions and gradient boosting trees, leveraging quantile-based input from the underlying supply-demand model. Our models can predict allocative efficiency with reasonable accuracy from the earliest bids and asks, and these predictions improve with additional realized price data. The performance of the prediction techniques varies by target and market type. Our framework holds significant potential for application to real-world market data, offering valuable insights into market efficiency and performance, even prior to any trade realizations.

We study whether simple algorithmic pricing systems can systematically produce collusive-like prices in multi-firm markets. We consider firms that price using a myopic estimate-then-optimize rule: each repeatedly fits a demand model to its own price and sales history and sets the price that maximizes estimated profit. This demand model is misspecified, omitting competitors' prices. We analyze the dynamics of this rule when it is initialized by an exploration phase of independent random prices. We characterize when this pipeline converges to supra-competitive prices above the Nash equilibrium, via a fluid-limit ordinary differential equation analysis. We show that supra-competitive prices arise when firms initially explore within similar price ranges on the same side of the Nash price. Moreover, prices can be substantially above the Nash price; we show that prices can reach monopoly levels under symmetric exploration. Simulations calibrated to a real multifamily rental market confirm that supra-competitive outcomes arise robustly beyond our theoretical assumptions, including under finite horizons, heterogeneous products, and nonlinear logit demand.