Decomposing Financial Market Dynamics via Mechanism Analysis in an Evolutionary Multi-Agent Simulation

High-fidelity, scalable market simulation is a key instrument for mechanism evaluation, stress testing, and counterfactual policy analysis. Yet existing simulators rarely achieve \emph{mechanism fidelity} beyond single-asset intraday settings, \emph{microstructure fidelity} against historical limit order books (LOB), and \emph{computational tractability} at market scale in a single system. This paper presents \textit{EvoMarket}, a discrete-event, multi-agent financial market simulator designed for intervention-oriented experiments in multi-asset and cross-day environments. EvoMarket couples a high-throughput execution core (optimized LOB data structures, hierarchical scheduling under propagation delays, and asynchronous per-asset matching) with explicit institutional mechanisms (market calendars, opening call auctions, price limits, and T+1 settlement). To avoid expensive black-box calibration, EvoMarket introduces an Oracle-guided in-run self-calibration mechanism that interprets microstructure discrepancy as missing order flow and synthesizes corrective orders at recording checkpoints. Experiments on China A-share order-flow and LOB data show close replay alignment over five trading days, fidelity gains from budgeted in-run calibration across depth levels, broad agent order-space coverage, and scalable performance under increasing input order rates and market breadth. We further demonstrate cross-asset linkage and event-study style intervention evaluation that produces structured dependence and interpretable event-time responses.

We introduce the Estimated Dynamic Equilibrium Model (EDEM), an agent-based framework that treats supply and demand as a coupled stochastic process driven by heterogeneous, noisy agent valuations. The model's primary technical contribution is the identification of a generative mechanism for persistent disequilibrium: when market-clearing prices are sequentially sampled from the upper tail of noisy bid distributions and recycled as inputs for future valuations, expected prices drift upward despite strictly zero-mean estimation errors. We derive this order-statistic bias in closed form for i.i.d. uniform bids and use simulations to show that compounding this bias across epochs yields exponential price growth without requiring assumptions of investor optimism or irrationality. This framework extends Miller's divergence-of-opinion theory to a dynamic setting, recovering Walrasian equilibrium and Miller's static premium as limiting cases. Through controlled experiments and sensitivity analysis on a simulated real-estate neighborhood, we identify six distinct regimes-ranging from band-stability to runaway bubbles-emerging from a single agent ruleset. These results offer a potential explanation for the contradictory findings in the empirical divergence-of-opinion literature and suggest that machine-learning valuation algorithms may inadvertently amplify this inherent statistical bias.

Some properties of so-called complex or collective systems can be observed to emerge from the interactions of elementary agents. This phenomenon, known as emergent behaviour, has long since been studied in the most diverse disciplines, with recent growing awareness from the formal methods community about the opportunity of opening up to seemingly distant disciplines with appropriate technology for computer-aided reasoning. Different peculiar elements of complexity make automated reasoning on these systems particularly challenging. We consider electronic financial markets to drive our discussion. We identify and structure the sources of complexity to tackle in order to provide computational support for the analysis of emergent phenomena. We refrain from evaluating the suitability of specific technical solutions or frameworks of preference, which would as usual require simplifying assumptions and divert from the actual phenomenon of interest. Rather, we elaborate on possible alternatives to handle some of the main technical aspects involved in automated analysis, while retaining a solid and concrete interpretation of the domain, and in doing so outline a more systematic research program for the formal specification and analysis of market mechanisms.