Financial, social, and political factors often prevent the interests of the owners of ML systems and services and their users from being perfectly aligned. ML systems often produce biased information that can influence users to make decisions that are not in their best interest. Current solution approaches require ML systems to implement protocols to mitigate their biases. However, ML system owners usually do not have any incentive to implement these protocols and often argue that it limits their freedom of expression or business. We believe that a successful solution to this problem must recognize the conflict of interest between the ML systems and their users, and use this information to protect users against information that adversely influences their decisions while allowing users to safely benefit from these systems. To this end, we propose a game-theoretic framework that models the interaction between ML systems and users with conflicts of interest. We present scalable algorithms with theoretical guarantees that maximize the amount of desired information and actions and minimize the amount of biased and manipulative actions in interaction with ML systems.
We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who must make decisions but is dependent on the Sender's information. We find that the Sender learns an optimal communication strategy that the Receiver reliably acts on. Importantly, this strategy is highly sensitive to the degree of conflict in the agents' rewards and the amount of environmental information the Receiver can already observe. We introduce a mechanism allowing the agents to form linear contracts, where a price is established for the information. We demonstrate that the Sender learns to use these payment structures to improve its rewards, though this comes at a cost of "fairness" between agents as the Sender is able to extract much of the Receiver's surplus. This raises questions about fairness, contract design, and learning in the context of multi-agent systems.
Machine learning models have been shown to exhibit discriminatory outcomes or degraded performance for individuals at the intersection of multiple sensitive attributes, such as race and gender. This stems in part from two interrelated challenges: the lack of principled measures for quantifying bias (potentially intersectional), and insufficient representation of intersectional subgroups in training data. We extend a recent bias mitigation framework to incorporate coverage constraints that enforce sufficient representation across groups, including intersectional subgroups. Since achieving exactly zero bias for all groups may not be data efficient (meaning it may require large amounts of data), our solution trades small approximation errors in bias for greater data efficiency while satisfying coverage constraints. We also formulate bias mitigation as an integer linear program that optimizes over all mitigation strategies, and characterize the price of fairness, the minimum data modification cost, as a function of fairness tolerance. This is essential both for legal compliance, where regulations may mandate specific fairness thresholds, and for data governance, enabling practitioners to make informed trade-offs between bias reduction and data modification (particularly, data purchasing) costs. We evaluate our techniques on publicly available datasets, demonstrating that bias mitigation via our framework preserves predictive accuracy across multiple classifiers, and that coverage constraints, while motivated by statistical considerations, are essential for preserving downstream ML performance.
While ML can produce complex models beyond those that a human could produce manually, incorporating human input can often improve performance beyond purely data-driven models. While this feedback could come from system designers or domain experts, in many cases, the end users who regularly use the system will naturally develop an understanding of its flaws and desire the ability to change the system's behavior based on their knowledge. While soliciting feedback from end users can result in significant model improvement over time, introducing these feedback techniques can also affect several human factors-such as trust or perception of system accuracy-that are not yet fully understood and have different effects reported in the existing literature. Therefore, we sought to build on the existing research to further explore how the act of providing feedback can affect user understanding of an intelligent system and its accuracy in different contexts. We present three controlled experiments that study the effects of interactive feedback collections on user impressions in domains with objective and subjective feedback. The results show that in a context where there is an objectively correct answer, providing HITL feedback lowered both participants' trust in the system and their perception of system accuracy, regardless of whether the system accuracy improved in response to their feedback. However, when the feedback being provided involved subjective opinion, no such negative bias was observed. Furthermore, in the objective context, participants distrusted the system over time, whereas participants in the subjective context mistrusted the system over time. These results highlight the importance of considering the effects of allowing different types of end-user feedback on user trust when designing intelligent systems.
Donald R. Honeycutt, Mahsan Nourani, Eric D. Ragan