Benchmarking Mythos-Linked Bug Rediscovery

We present swarm-attack, an open-source adversarial testing framework in which multiple lightweight LLM agents coordinate through shared memory, parallel exploration, and evolutionary optimization. Together, our results demonstrate that both safety bypass of frontier models and software vulnerability discovery, i.e., the capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview, are achievable at effectively zero cost using commodity hardware and openly available models. We report two experiments. In the first, five instances of a 1.2 billion parameter model conducted 225 jailbreak attacks each against GPT-4o and Claude Sonnet~4. Against GPT-4o, the swarm achieved an Effective Harm Rate of 45.8%, producing 49 critical-severity breaches; against Claude Sonnet-4, the Effective Harm Rate was 0% despite a 40% technical success rate. In the second experiment, the same models performed combined source code analysis and binary fuzzing against a vulnerable C application with 9 planted CWEs. With a hand-crafted exploit seed corpus, regex pattern detection, and AddressSanitizer-based crash classification, the pipeline recovers 9 of 9 vulnerabilities (100% recall) in approximately four minutes on a consumer MacBook. With those scaffold components disabled, the same model recovers 0 of 9 by crash verification and 2 of 9 by citation. The capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview is therefore reproducible at effectively zero cost; the important enabler is the system scaffold itself, which compensates for the limited reasoning capacity of small individual models.

LLM-based analyzers have begun finding real vulnerabilities in mature open-source projects: AISLE's analyzer is credited with more than 280 CVEs across 78 projects, including OpenSSL, curl, and GnuTLS. We introduce HoF-Bench (named after AISLE's public Hall of Fame), a benchmark built from 95 of these public AI-discovered CVEs across eight repositories pinned at vulnerable commits. Analyzers receive source and target-file scope but not CVE identifiers, descriptions, fixes, or expected mechanisms; a detector-blinded frontier-model judge credits only findings that identify the same code path, root cause, attack condition, and impact. A deliberately minimal LLM-based analyzer rediscovers up to 65 of the 95 CVEs (68%) under this strict protocol. No frontier model performs detection anywhere in the study. The ten detector backbones are five open-weight models (21B--284B total parameters, 3--13B active) and five proprietary small or "flash"-tier models. All of them run in the fixed scaffold with four repeated passes, an optional generated-context stage, and a replayable multi-round triage stage (7,600 model--CVE pass records). Difficulty is strongly structured by language; the CVEs missed by every model concentrate in C infrastructure code. HoF-Bench provides a compact test bed for comparing vulnerability scanners, their reliability across repeated runs, and the candidate volume they create. The dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/aisleinc/HoF-Bench.

Developers increasingly delegate real maintenance work to product-grade coding agents, and many state tasks in their native language, in the style of a customer request rather than a curated English issue. Existing repository-level agentic benchmarks do not measure this setting: their task statements are English by design. We introduce RuBench 1.0, a benchmark of 25 tasks mined from recent fix commits in five live open-source repositories (aiohttp, aiogram, Laravel, NestJS, Fastify; Python, PHP, TypeScript, JavaScript), where each task is specified natively in Russian -- written from scratch in the style of an actual customer request, not translated -- and judged by the upstream maintainer's regression tests, which we withhold from release. All 25 fix commits postdate the training-data cutoffs of every evaluated model, giving a contamination argument that holds task-by-task. We evaluate deployed product configurations (CLI agent + model + reasoning effort) -- Claude Code with Opus 4.8, Sonnet 5, and Haiku 4.5, and Codex CLI with GPT-5.5 -- with three independent runs each, reporting pass@1 with task-level confidence intervals, paired comparisons, dollar cost, and token usage. The best configuration resolves 78.7% of tasks; at N=25 only the gaps to the weakest model are statistically resolvable, which we state explicitly. Auditing full trajectories of a fifth, hors-concours configuration (Claude Code + Fable 5, July 2, 2026 release), we caught the product silently substituting the model: on 5 of 25 tasks (20%) an official safeguard fallback re-routed routine HTTP-protocol fixes to Opus 4.8 -- direct, reproducible evidence that the deployed product, not the model, is the unit actually measured. We release task statements, metadata, full agent trajectories, and diffs; grading oracles are withheld, with a SHA-256 manifest committed at publication time.