While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into in-vehicle conversational systems, identifying the optimal model remains challenging due to the lack of domain-specific evaluation standards tailored to real-world deployment requirements. In this paper, we propose a novel evaluation framework for in-vehicle assistants, with a particular focus on Korean-language localization. Our empirical analysis reveals notable patterns in model behavior. First, fine-grained Korean honorific control remains unstable in current LLMs, indicating that precise speech-level realization must be explicitly evaluated in localization settings. Second, models exhibit weaker performance in strategic conversational metrics like clarification and proactivity. Our analysis suggests this stems from the inherent subjective complexity of these tasks, where our framework adopts a conservative evaluation stance to prioritize reliability. Together, our findings underscore that automotive AI must move beyond general competence toward precise linguistic tailoring and reliable, safety-oriented interaction management.
This paper appraises recent frameworks within AI development to integrate LLMs into control tasks in automotive contexts from the perspective of safety assurance. This work has built upon the rapid integration of LLMs across automotive settings. However, we find that at present, these frameworks face significant challenges, limiting their efficacy in real-time safety-critical contexts. Firstly, we consider conceptual challenges, including the fact that deployers are faced with a dual challenge, wherein they must assure a model which has been developed upstream, i.e. as general-purpose tools by the large AI labs, in a downstream context, i.e. into specific vehicle architectures. Secondly, we consider concrete challenges from across existing standards. We show that there are currently both fundamental engineering constraints covered in ISO21448, such as latency, and novel LLM-specific issues, such as alignment-related issues covered in ISO/PAS8800. We ground both examples in a concrete introductory, experimental case study exploring an existing open-source repository, Talk2Drive. We present a safety argument in order to make explicit the limitations of existing solutions. Nonetheless, given that the use of LLMs in automotive contexts is being explored at a technical level and operationalised, we propose potential assurance mechanisms for LLM-related hazardous events going forward.
Speech language models (SpeechLMs) have achieved substantial progress by extending large language models (LLMs) to the speech modality. However, SpeechLM evaluation remains heavily centered on English, limiting reliable assessment of multilingual speech capabilities. Straightforward benchmark transfer through ASR, translation, normalization, and TTS can corrupt language-specific instructions, answer constraints, and spoken forms; for audio understanding, transferring source-language audio also fails to preserve target-language speaker attributes, accents, and paralinguistic properties. To address these limitations, we propose two human-agent benchmark-construction frameworks: one transfers source-language SpokenQA benchmarks into target-language SpokenQA benchmarks, and the other converts target-language ASR corpora into audio understanding benchmarks using transcriptions and speaker metadata. Using these frameworks, we construct and publicly release three Korean speech benchmarks: KVoiceBench and KOpenAudioBench for Korean SpokenQA, and KMMAU for Korean audio understanding, comprising 12,345 samples in total. We evaluate eight recent SpeechLMs and find that English-Korean performance gaps vary substantially across models and task families, and that SpokenQA and audio understanding rankings diverge, revealing complementary weaknesses invisible to English-only evaluation.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into vehicle voice assistants. But linking natural-language requests to vehicle functions creates a safety-critical authorization problem. Before executing a command, the system must choose whether to execute, refuse, clarify, require confirmation, defer to manual control, trigger an emergency response, or make no tool call. To our knowledge, prior evaluations do not isolate this pre-action decision across speaker role, authentication status, vehicle state, and tool availability. We introduce a 202-scenario benchmark with Reference Decisions under a seven-class taxonomy. We evaluate two local open-weight models and three API-based LLMs using Decision Alignment and safety-specific error metrics. Alignment ranges from 40.1% for Llama 3.2 3B to 89.1% for Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview. The API-based models score between 83.2% and 89.1%, with no statistically significant differences among them. Even these models produce two to three False Executes among 161 non-execution scenarios, and persistent errors remain in confirmation and manual-control decisions. A controlled Llama 3.2 3B ablation increases alignment to 40.1% under the structured authorization policy, versus 28.2-29.2% under schema-only and generic-safety baselines, but it does not eliminate False Executes. Structured LLM decisions are therefore insufficient as a standalone safety mechanism, and deployment requires an independent enforcement layer that verifies tool permissions and vehicle-state constraints before invoking any vehicle function.