As long-horizon coding agents produce more code than any developer can review, oversight collapses onto a single surface: the automated test suite. Reward hacking naturally arises in this setup, as the agent optimizes for passing tests while deviating from the users true goal. We study this reward hacking phenomenon by decompose software engineering tasks into three parts: (i) a natural language description of the specification (ii) visible validation tests that exercise specified features in isolation, and (iii) held-out tests that compose those same features to simulate real-world usage. Based on the specification and the visible validation test suites, a genuine agent would be able to generate a solution that can also pass all of the held-out tests. Therefore we use the gap in pass rates on these two suites to quantify reward hacking. Based on this methodology, we introduce SpecBench, a benchmark comprising 30 systems-level programming tasks ranging from short horizon tasks like building a JSON parser to ultra long horizon tasks like building an entire OS kernel from scratch. Large-scale experiments reveal a consistent pattern: while every frontier agent saturates the visible suite, reward hacking persists, with smaller models exhibiting larger gaps on holdout suites. The gap also scales sharply with task length: it grows by 28 percentage points for every tenfold increase in code size. Failures range from subtle feature isolation to deliberate exploits, including a 2,900-line hash-table "compiler" that memorizes test inputs. SpecBench offers a principled testbed for measuring whether coding agents build genuine working systems or merely game the test suites developers hand them.
DeepSWE is a benchmark of 113 original, long-horizon software engineering tasks for evaluating coding agents. Most public agentic coding benchmarks follow SWE-bench in mining merged fixes from public GitHub repositories, which creates two problems: the fixes and their discussion were likely seen during pretraining, so a high score can reflect recall rather than problem-solving; and each task is graded by the tests that shipped with its merged fix, which were written to confirm one specific fix rather than grade an arbitrary solution, so they can fail a correct alternative or pass an incomplete one. DeepSWE avoids both. Its tasks are written from scratch across 91 active open-source repositories and five languages and are never contributed back upstream, so their reference solutions stay out of the public record that model training scrapes; and each task is graded by a hand-written verifier that checks the requested functionality and accepts any implementation that provides it. When an independent LLM judge re-reviews graded runs, it disagrees with DeepSWE's verifier about an order of magnitude less often than with SWE-Bench Pro's inherited tests (1.4% versus 32.4%). Despite being about half the length of SWE-Bench Pro's prompts, DeepSWE's prompts describe tasks whose reference solutions touch 5.5x more code, and the benchmark separates frontier agents across a wider score band than the leaderboards on which they otherwise cluster. We release the benchmark, its verifiers, and the full record of evaluation trajectories.
LLM agents are increasingly used to run autonomous ML experiments, iterating on target metrics with little human oversight. Prior work has documented reward hacking in these environments, bringing into question the validity of produced research and the broader safety case for AI R&D. Existing benchmarks do not measure exploits that live in the data or the modeling task itself. We introduce BAITBENCH, a suite of three synthetic tabular ML tasks that each contain a shortcut that allows agents to inflate the public test score but fail on a hidden test set. Since the shortcut is optional and using it breaks no stated rule, BAITBENCH measures how often models exploit the shortcut to achieve inflated scores. Across seven frontier agents scored by our two-stage judge pipeline, 57.1% of runs exhibit reward hacking, with five of seven above 50%. Agents cheat even under a second condition where they are prompted not to -the mean cheating rate remains above 50%. We release BAITBENCH, along with the judge implementation, and an annotated dataset of transcripts containing reward hacks as a testbed for evaluating reward-hacking mitigations head-to-head.
Pradyumna Shyama Prasad, Meiri Anto, Leon Eshuijs +3
Aligning autonomous agents with human intent remains a central challenge in modern AI. A key manifestation of this challenge is reward hacking, whereby agents appear successful under the evaluation signal while violating the intended objective. Reward hacking has been observed across a wide range of settings, yet methods for reliably measuring it at scale remain lacking. In this work, we introduce a new evaluation paradigm for measuring reward hacking. Whereas prior studies have primarily analyzed it post hoc by inspecting agent trajectories, we instead embed detectable reward hacking opportunities directly into environments. This makes their exploitation verifiable by design, enabling deterministic and automated measurement of whether and how agents exploit such vulnerabilities. We instantiate this approach in TextArena and release Hack-Verifiable TextArena, a testbed in which reward hacking can be measured reliably. Using this benchmark, we analyze reward hacking behavior across language models in diverse environments and settings. We open source the code at https://github.com/MajoRoth/hack-verifiable-environments/.