Organizations: Department of Mathematics Faculty of Science The University of Hong Kong Hong Kong SAR · School of Computing and Mathematical Sciences Faculty of Engineering and Science University of Greenwich United Kingdom
While large-scale models such as LLMs and diffusion models have achieved practical success, public institutions have emphasized the importance of explainability in AI. Existing methods for explaining AI, however, are not designed to provide completely faithful explanations of the behavior of large-scale AI systems. Although a completely faithful and interpretable explanation of the behavior of an AI system might be useful for AI governance, it has not been known whether providing such an explanation is theoretically possible. In this paper, we mathematically prove a fundamental quadrilemma in explaining AI, stating that AI and its explanation cannot satisfy the following four conditions simultaneously: 1) the complexity of the operation environment, 2) the goodness of the AI's performance, 3) the interpretability of the AI's explanation, and 4) the complete faithfulness of the AI's explanation. This quadrilemma suggests that, in most applications where we cannot change the environment or sacrifice good AI performance and an interpretable explanation, we should give up complete faithfulness of explanations and should instead aim to explain only the parts that are important for applications. As a consequence, the quadrilemma implies that AI governance should be designed on the premise that the faithfulness of AI explanations is always incomplete.
Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate natural language explanations that rationalize their own decisions, a phenomenon commonly referred to as self-explanations. Such explanations have emerged as a promising direction for explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), particularly for interpreting LLM behavior. However, while self-explanations often appear plausible, whether they faithfully reflect a model's underlying reasoning process remains an open question. In this opinion paper, we argue that self-explanations can be highly plausible, questionably faithful, and yet highly actionable. From a traditional XAI perspective, we identify the limitations of standard evaluation protocols for LLM-generated self-explanations and propose practical guidelines for assessing their plausibility and faithfulness. Moreover, we argue that evaluation should extend beyond these criteria to actionability, highlighting applications of LLM rationalization capabilities that support informed decision-making and appropriate action across diverse stakeholders.
How to define a good explanation is a long-standing philosophical debate which has found recent renewed interest in the context of AI outputs. Explainability is crucial for AI adoption in many contexts, but in order to produce good explanations of AI systems, we must first have an understanding of what good explanations are. In this paper we propose a definition inspired by the notion of counterfactual explanations, however we argue that one must also take into account the interlocutor's prior beliefs in each fact that could be offered in an explanation. We explore the ramifications of this definition for AI explainability and, in particular, why LLM outputs are difficult to produce good explanations for.
When asked to explain their decisions, LLMs can often give explanations which sound plausible to humans. But are these explanations faithful, i.e. do they convey the factors actually responsible for the decision? In this work, we analyse counterfactual faithfulness across 75 models from 13 families. We analyze the tradeoff between conciseness and comprehensiveness, how correlational faithfulness metrics assess this tradeoff, and the extent to which metrics can be gamed. This analysis motivates two new metrics: the phi-CCT, a simplified variant of the Correlational Counterfactual Test (CCT) which avoids the need for token probabilities while explaining most of the variance of the original test; and F-AUROC, which eliminates sensitivity to imbalanced intervention distributions and captures a model's ability to produce explanations with different levels of detail. Our findings reveal a clear scaling trend: larger and more capable models are consistently more faithful on all metrics we consider. Our code is available at https://github.com/google-deepmind/corr_faith.
Noah Y. Siegel, Nicolas Heess, Maria Perez-Ortiz +1