Language models are increasingly being deployed as user simulators, but their memory is far more reliable than that of real users. To measure this gap, we run a series of classic memory experiments from psychology on both humans and language models. Across tasks, we find that out-of-the-box language models exhibit better memory than humans, even when prompted to imitate human behavior. We then show that better prompting strategies and the use of a compactor can cause language models to forget content in a more human-like way. Using these methods, we show preliminary evidence that language models with human-like memory constraints can function as more effective user simulators in a downstream education task. Finally, we release human reference data and benchmarks to support future work on simulating human memory with language models.
We reproduce and stress-test the work of Yu et al. (2023), who characterize how language models (LMs) arbitrate between memorized knowledge and contradictory in-context statements. We replicate their world-capitals experiments on 31 models spanning Pythia, GPT-2, Qwen3, and Ministral families, including base and post-trained variants, and extend evaluations to five additional knowledge relation types from the ParaConflict dataset. We empirically confirm most of their original findings: larger models and higher-frequency entities tend to favor memorized answers, with substantial family-level variance. However, several conclusions do not generalize cleanly: entity-frequency effects disappear on Qwen3-14B and 32B; post-training shifts the memory-context trade-off inconsistently across families; question phrasing alone can change a model's reliance on memorized knowledge by up to 80 percentage points; and semantically unrelated prose can mimic coherent supporting context. Our results clarify where Yu et al.'s claims hold and to what extent they generalize to other prompts.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behavior but frequently fail to exhibit realistic cognitive constraints, suffering from a "superhuman bias." Using a dataset of over 71,000 reading comprehension responses from 2,359 primary-school students (grades 4--6), we demonstrate that standard persona prompting yields near-perfect, deterministic performance, failing to capture the natural variance of developing readers. To address this, we introduce the Cognitively Bounded User Simulator (CBUS), an architectural framework that explicitly models the restricted working memory of young readers through an episodic bottleneck. Within this framework, we formalize two distinct test-taking strategies to emulate different reading behaviors. Our evaluation shows that explicitly modeling cognitive bounds significantly narrows the simulation gap across multiple LLM backbones, demonstrating that enforcing architectural constraints is more effective for high-fidelity simulation than simply scaling raw model capabilities.
Models trained on a new task typically degrade on prior tasks, a phenomenon known as forgetting. Traditionally, mitigating forgetting has required replaying stored exemplars from prior tasks, which is often impractical. By contrast, language models can sample from their own training distribution, and we show that these self-generated samples serve as effective replay data, nearly eliminating forgetting. We find that forgetting nonetheless persists when the model has little remaining capacity: models pretrained close to saturation cannot absorb new information without overwriting prior knowledge. When capacity is not the limiting factor, low learning rates reduce forgetting but require substantially more training steps. Replay breaks this tradeoff, enabling fast, high-learning-rate finetuning without forgetting.