From Task Allocation to Risk Clearing: A Unifying Interface for Mixed Human-Agent Societies

Adaptive orchestration of heterogeneous agents requires making sequential delegation decisions under uncertain and evolving agent behaviour, e.g., coordinating specialised AI models with varying reliability, cost, and response quality. While prior work on agent orchestration focuses on performance or cost, uncertainty in agent reliability and output distributions is typically not modelled explicitly at the orchestration level. In this work, we study the problem of adaptive orchestration of heterogeneous agents under uncertainty, where a meta-controller must decide when to delegate to an agent, accounting for reliability, cost, and uncertainty. We propose BOT-Orch, a lightweight framework that recasts orchestration as a bandit problem over agents, regularized by OT distances between agent output distributions and task-specific reference distributions. We show that the regularised orchestration enjoys $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret under standard assumptions, and provably induces preference ordering among agents with identical mean rewards but differing distributional alignment. Empirically, we demonstrate that BOT-Orch outperforms standard bandit and heuristic baselines in synthetic but adversarial task allocation settings with heterogeneous, non-i.i.d. agent behaviour.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

Agent safety is moving from content moderation toward preventing operational failures before tool-using agents act. We propose Janus, a foresight-oriented framework for long-horizon agent safety that trains guards to anticipate delayed risks from partial trajectories. Janus synthesizes diverse agent trajectories via multi-agent simulation and learns a shared policy with two coupled tasks: an anticipation task that forecasts safety-relevant futures and an adjudication task that decides safety from both the observed prefix and anticipated future. The two tasks are jointly optimized with CoAA-RL, which rewards forecasts by their utility for downstream safety judgment. The resulting guard model, Vanguard, blocks unsafe actions before execution. Across four agent-safety benchmarks, Vanguard improves average protection by 15.9 percentage points over baseline guards while increasing benign task completion by 5.1 percentage points.