Inferring Code Correctness from Specification

Unlike natural-language specifications, executable formal specifications provide machine-checkable constraints for verifying, debugging, and repairing code. However, writing such specifications is labor-intensive, and existing LLM-based methods mainly infer whole-program pre/postconditions, missing the intermediate semantic commitments that programmers rely on when reasoning about an algorithm. Our study further shows that prompting current CodeLLMs often produces executable assertions that are syntactically invalid, trivial, or too weak to reject behavior-changing faults. In this paper, we study executable checkpoint specification generation, where assertions are inserted at meaningful internal program points to describe expected intermediate states. We introduce SpecCoder, a verification-guided CodeLLM training framework that learns from validated reference programs, behavior-changing mutants, and multi-turn specification-refinement traces. SpecCoder selects specifications that hold on correct executions while rejecting faulty executions, turning specifications from passive annotations into executable evidence. To evaluate this setting, we introduce HumanExec, a benchmark built from recent Codeforces competitive programming problems with test suites, reference solutions, and human buggy submissions, supporting three tasks: specification generation, program correctness checking, and program repair. Experiments on HumanExec show that SpecCoder substantially improves checkpoint-specification quality over base CodeLLMs. Across Qwen2.5-Coder models, SpecCoder improves inline-specification correctness by up to 55.8%, completeness by up to 358.1%, and executable assertion validity by up to 26.6%. These gains further translate to downstream correctness reasoning and repair, showing that executable checkpoints provide fine-grained evidence for reliable verification.

Large language models frequently generate code that appears correct on typical inputs yet fails on edge cases, invalid inputs, and other specification-defined corner conditions. A popular fix has the model write its own tests and repair until they pass, but the source of the gain is unclear: does it come from the tests merely existing, or from their grounding in a specification of what the code should do? We isolate this factor. Holding the tester, test budget, and repair loop fixed, we change a single prompt line that controls whether the tester receives the spec as a checklist of rules. The baseline is strong: it is already told to probe invalid inputs and edge cases. Grounding the tests in the spec produces correct code +38 percentage points more often than this baseline across three Claude tiers (Haiku 4.5, Sonnet 4.6, Opus 4.8), and +36 points on a held-out set. Grounding, not test quantity, is the primary driver: doubling the test budget barely helps, and combining eight independent ungrounded suites plateaus far below grounding. An ablation isolates the spec's content, not its format: given the spec as a plain paragraph the tester recovers 27 of 30 bugs, but asked to plan tests without the spec it recovers only 2 of 30. The effect survives stronger baselines: a property-based generator catches 28 of 30 bugs but invents out-of-spec requirements, and an AlphaCodium-style loop only matches the baseline. It replicates across vendors (GPT-5.3-codex +28, Gemini 3.5 Flash +19), with a task-level sign test over 18 tasks significant at p=0.002. Grounding improves both sensitivity and precision: it catches more real bugs and wrongly rejects far less correct code, cutting the false-alarm rate from 33% (68% against a Python standard-library oracle) to 0%. On well-specified algorithmic problems it neither helps nor hurts.

This study empirically evaluates whether cost-efficient Large Language Models (LLMs) can be trusted to generate enterprise code to a written specification. Three models (Gemini Flash 3, GPT-5.4 mini and Claude Haiku 4.5) were asked to solve 992 algorithmic problems as Java Spring Boot service methods conforming to a mandated signature and data-transfer-object specification, crossing four model and agentic coding tool combinations with two prompt variants to yield eight configurations, with iteration forbidden and hardcoded answers explicitly prohibited. Eight problem statements were withheld to probe how models respond to missing input. The 7,593 resulting methods were classified by an eight-class outcome taxonomy describing what each does about producing an answer, then deployed and executed, giving 7,936 measured requests joined to that classification. Structural conformance approached ceiling, yet 38.4% of methods do not compute the value they returned and only 12.9% of returned answers were correct. Conditioning on outcome class shows that response reliability and correctness are inversely related, whereas genuinely computing methods answered least often and were correct 19.3%. Limitations include single generation runs per configuration, partial harness coverage, single-pass timing, syntactic classification, and probable corpus contamination.