Authors: Anastasia Kotelnikova, Viktor Byzov, Maria Dolzhenkova, Evgeny Kotelnikov
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) remain limited on tasks requiring indirect reasoning, cultural knowledge, and coordinated hypothesis testing. We investigate whether team-based interaction improves LLM performance in What? Where? When? (ChGK), a quiz game designed to reward collective reasoning. We introduce three team strategies: Voting, Silent Team (the captain observes final answers), and Talkative Team (the captain observes both answers and rationales). To minimize data leakage, we evaluate these strategies on a dataset consisting of 572 ChGK questions released in 2025. Using six recent large-scale open models, we show that team-based strategies outperform single-model baselines, yielding gains of up to 20 percentage points in accuracy. The best team achieves 44.23% accuracy, and approaches human team performance on questions with available human statistics. Analysis of inter-model diversity reveals that disagreement strongly predicts lower accuracy, but explanatory communication substantially mitigates performance drops. We further examine captain behavior and find no evidence of self-preference bias; access to peer rationales improves captain judgments. Overall, LLM teams function primarily as answer selection and error-filtering mechanisms rather than generators of novel solutions. Our findings highlight the importance of interaction and suggest adaptive strategies as a promising direction for multi-agent systems.
We introduce a multi-turn interactive framework for reasoning evaluation that treats reasoning as active evidence acquisition and belief updating. Wherein, LLMs receive only the task rules, must issue targeted queries to a hidden environment, integrate partial observations over time, and decide when to submit a final answer. Beyond standard success rate and interaction efficiency, we evaluate contextual robustness under controlled contextual perturbations, and metacognitive adaptation through counterfactual revision and necessity judgment. We instantiate the framework as a benchmark of 474 executable games, each evaluated under five fixed configuration search spaces corresponding to five difficulty levels, and evaluate a broad set of frontier LLMs. Results show that the benchmark is highly discriminative, exposing large differences not only in success rate but also in interaction efficiency. Moreover, we empirically show that contextual perturbations cause moderate but consistent declines, whereas counterfactual revision and necessity judgment lead to much larger drops.
Multi-agent systems built from teams of large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for collaborative scientific reasoning and problem-solving. These systems require agents to coordinate under shared constraints, such as GPUs or credit balances, where cooperative behavior matters. Behavioral economics provides a rich toolkit of games that isolate distinct cooperation mechanisms, yet it remains unknown whether a model's behavior in these stylized settings predicts its performance in realistic collaborative tasks. Here, we benchmark 35 open-weight LLMs across six behavioral economics games and show that game-derived cooperative profiles robustly predict downstream performance in AI-for-Science tasks, where teams of LLM agents collaboratively analyze data, build models, and produce scientific reports under shared budget constraints. Models that effectively coordinate games and invest in multiplicative team production (rather than greedy strategies) produce better scientific reports across three outcomes, accuracy, quality, and completion. These associations hold after controlling for multiple factors, indicating that cooperative disposition is a distinct, measurable property of LLMs not reducible to general ability. Our behavioral games framework thus offers a fast and inexpensive diagnostic for screening cooperative fitness before costly multi-agent deployment.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly tasked with strategic decision-making under incomplete information, such as in negotiation and policymaking. While LLMs can excel at many such tasks, they also fail in ways that are poorly understood. We shed light on these failures by uncovering two fundamental gaps in the internal mechanisms underlying the decision-making of LLMs in incomplete-information games, supported by experiments with open-weight models Llama 3.1, Qwen3, and gpt-oss. First, an observation-belief gap: LLMs encode internal beliefs about latent game states that are substantially more accurate than their own verbal reports, yet these beliefs are brittle. In particular, the belief accuracy degrades with multi-hop reasoning, exhibits primacy and recency biases, and drifts away from Bayesian coherence over extended interactions. Second, a belief-action gap: The implicit conversion of internal beliefs into actions is weaker than that of the beliefs externalized in the prompt, yet neither belief-conditioning consistently achieves higher game payoffs. These results show how analyzing LLMs' internal processes can expose systematic vulnerabilities that warrant caution before deploying LLMs in strategic domains without robust guardrails.