How Early Adopters Used Generative AI Worldwide: Variation by Country Income and Language

This paper introduces the AI & Economy ATLAS (Activity, Task, Landscape, and Adoption Study), an ongoing economic research initiative using Google AI usage data. The first iteration of ATLAS is built on 15 million de-identified interactions across the Gemini App, Google AI Mode, and Gemini API. Using privacy-preserving algorithms as well as established and bespoke classification methods, we map AI usage to over 800 occupations, 4000 tasks, 300 household activities, 150 countries, and 140 languages. We then make a number of observations on what the data reveals about AI's diffusion, and its usage at work and in day-to-day life. In the workplace, we show that while AI adoption spans occupations covering just above 88% of US employment, penetration remains shallow and overwhelmingly collaborative in nature, with end-to-end task automation limited in scope. Outside of work, AI spans activities making up about 98% of Americans' non-sleep time, with disproportionately high use in high-friction tasks such as engaging with government and professional service providers, likely delivering economic value that standard national accounts may miss. Globally, adoption scales with national wealth and has broad linguistic distribution, with English queries representing only around a third of volume. As we build upon ATLAS and expand its scope and capabilities, we will continue to provide large-scale empirical evidence to inform the public, policy and academic questions about the ongoing AI transformation.

Recent evidence reported by Tully, Longoni, and Appel (2025) suggests that lower artificial intelligence (AI) literacy predicts greater receptivity toward AI. We revisit this claim using the public data from Study 3 of that article, which measures past usage of five AI tool categories on a five-point frequency scale. We first reproduce the negative association between AI literacy and aggregate AI usage using OLS on participant-level averages, binary logit, ordered logit, and multinomial logit specifications. We then show that the aggregate relationship masks substantial heterogeneity by tool type. In our demographic-adjusted primary specification, AI literacy does not significantly predict text AI usage (ordered-logit $β$ = -0.090, p = .387), whereas it remains a strong predictor of non-text AI adoption ($β$ = -0.377, p < .001). The non-text effect is also robust under Tully et al.'s original Study 3 control specification ($β$ = -0.502, p < .001). Binary, ordered-logit, and multinomial specifications suggest that the non-text relationship is primarily an adoption/non-adoption pattern rather than evidence of intensive use: the demographic-adjusted odds ratio of ever having used a non-text AI tool is 0.68. Thus, in the study that measures self-reported past usage rather than stated preferences, the evidence does not support a simple claim that lower AI literacy predicts greater receptivity to AI in general. It points instead to a narrower pattern of broader adoption across lower-penetration, non-text AI tools.

Frontier AI's labor-market effects matter to workers, firms, and policymakers, but current evidence generally comes from a handful of high-income economies. The capabilities of frontier AI are jagged across work tasks and national economies diverge in how they allocate human labor. We introduce a national AI exposure metric that combines occupation-level exposure scores and international employment data for 141 countries. We find that high income countries are substantially more exposed than low income countries and that Europe and Central Asia are 50 percent more exposed than Sub-Saharan Africa. We also find a gender gap: women are more exposed than men in 91 percent of countries, driven by their concentration in white-collar and sales occupations. The exceptions are countries where women's employment remains concentrated in agriculture and household enterprises. We validate our national AI exposure estimates by showing they predict national AI adoption statistics published by Anthropic, Microsoft, and OpenAI. Beyond direct exposure, we identify a new mechanism for indirect exposure due to cross-country income dependencies. Some nations such as Tajikistan depend heavily on foreign workers remitting money back to their home countries: Tajikistan's direct exposure to frontier AI is below-average but because 37 percent of Tajikistan GDP is Russian remittance and Russia is very exposed, Tajikistan's remittance-accounted exposure becomes above-average. Our research shows that national variation in exposure is large enough that policy responses calibrated to U.S. or European labor markets will not generalize.