This paper introduces the AI & Economy ATLAS (Activity, Task, Landscape, and Adoption Study), an ongoing economic research initiative using Google AI usage data. The first iteration of ATLAS is built on 15 million de-identified interactions across the Gemini App, Google AI Mode, and Gemini API. Using privacy-preserving algorithms as well as established and bespoke classification methods, we map AI usage to over 800 occupations, 4000 tasks, 300 household activities, 150 countries, and 140 languages. We then make a number of observations on what the data reveals about AI's diffusion, and its usage at work and in day-to-day life. In the workplace, we show that while AI adoption spans occupations covering just above 88% of US employment, penetration remains shallow and overwhelmingly collaborative in nature, with end-to-end task automation limited in scope. Outside of work, AI spans activities making up about 98% of Americans' non-sleep time, with disproportionately high use in high-friction tasks such as engaging with government and professional service providers, likely delivering economic value that standard national accounts may miss. Globally, adoption scales with national wealth and has broad linguistic distribution, with English queries representing only around a third of volume. As we build upon ATLAS and expand its scope and capabilities, we will continue to provide large-scale empirical evidence to inform the public, policy and academic questions about the ongoing AI transformation.
We study how organizations use frontier generative AI by linking ChatGPT Enterprise account records to usage, worker roles, task classifications, and public-company financial data through March 2026. These linked data enable a privacy-preserving analysis of adoption, worker roles, and message-level tasks at scale: for instance, the worker-level sample we analyze at the six-month adoption horizon includes over 1,500 organizations and over 17 million messages. We document four facts about enterprise AI adoption and use. First, ChatGPT Enterprise usage has grown rapidly due to a combination of new firm adoption and growing intensity among existing adopters. Second, U.S.-based public company adoption is concentrated among larger, more valuable, and more R&D- and SG&A-intensive firms. Third, active use within adopting firms spans job functions and seniority levels, with especially high usage intensity among early-career workers. Fourth, ChatGPT Enterprise usage encompasses a broad range of knowledge work tasks, including writing, technical work, communication, and information synthesis. In aggregate, these results suggest that firms differ widely in the speed, breadth and purpose of their enterprise AI adoption, and that they are still actively learning how to integrate AI into organizational workflows.
AI is being used by people globally, but not everyone is using it in the same ways. Using a large-scale dataset of anonymized, de-identified, and privacy-scrubbed interactions with a widely available and free AI chatbot, we empirically characterize differences in early adopters' usage across countries. Schooling is the most common domain of use in most countries, particularly low-income countries, with a strong inverse association evident between schooling and country-level GDP. Leisure-related use, by contrast, is positively associated with country-level income. Language, we find, also shapes use: English-language interactions are overrepresented in places where the predominant languages were not well-served by existing models during the period of the study. Improving performance across languages may be a key factor, our work suggests, in whether this technology expands digital divides or enables leapfrogging.
Frontier AI's labor-market effects matter to workers, firms, and policymakers, but current evidence generally comes from a handful of high-income economies. The capabilities of frontier AI are jagged across work tasks and national economies diverge in how they allocate human labor. We introduce a national AI exposure metric that combines occupation-level exposure scores and international employment data for 141 countries. We find that high income countries are substantially more exposed than low income countries and that Europe and Central Asia are 50 percent more exposed than Sub-Saharan Africa. We also find a gender gap: women are more exposed than men in 91 percent of countries, driven by their concentration in white-collar and sales occupations. The exceptions are countries where women's employment remains concentrated in agriculture and household enterprises. We validate our national AI exposure estimates by showing they predict national AI adoption statistics published by Anthropic, Microsoft, and OpenAI. Beyond direct exposure, we identify a new mechanism for indirect exposure due to cross-country income dependencies. Some nations such as Tajikistan depend heavily on foreign workers remitting money back to their home countries: Tajikistan's direct exposure to frontier AI is below-average but because 37 percent of Tajikistan GDP is Russian remittance and Russia is very exposed, Tajikistan's remittance-accounted exposure becomes above-average. Our research shows that national variation in exposure is large enough that policy responses calibrated to U.S. or European labor markets will not generalize.