How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.
Multi-agent studies commonly place AI agents in predefined games, markets, or roles, making it difficult to distinguish endogenous economic organization from behavior inherited from the scenario. We ask whether economic relations emerge when agents receive executable mechanisms for work, transfer, elections, and allocation but no prescribed social or economic strategy. We define AI Agent Economics as systems of production, allocation, consumption, exchange, and institutions that alter agents' future feasible actions. We develop a two-stage framework comprising a no-production boundary test and 24 independent six-agent worlds across GPT and DeepSeek. Without productive tasks, agents communicate and govern resource provision but show no substantive inter-agent transfer activity. With verified work and scarce task access, transfers, loans, access promises, vote-for-access exchanges, and allocation strategies emerge. Holding the election interface fixed, executable allocation authority increases differentiation while reducing failed allocation and prolonged exclusion. When energy becomes symbolic, continuation support disappears, yet competition over task access persists. These findings show that organization follows executable rights and resource consequences rather than role labels or prompt language, and motivate governance audits of the mechanisms that actually constrain agents' future actions.
The success of deployed agents relies on their ability to handle open-ended user requests using their inherent capabilities, not only in solving requests directly but also in effectively leveraging inter-agent communication channels and feedback signals over time. This requires a multi-agent environment where agents can operate autonomously, strategically communicate, behave collaboratively and be driven by economic incentives, much like humans in society. Towards this vision, we propose AgentSociety, a mechanism that enables decentralized agentic collaboration grounded in liquid democracy and information diffusion from social choice theory. We show that AgentSociety provides an environment for agents to make autonomous decisions utilizing their local context to maximize their utility while achieving collective outcomes through incentivized collaboration. Specifically, we prove that delegation to more competent neighbor agents is incentive compatible and naturally generates multi-agent routing path by consensus. Additionally, our mechanism incentivizes agents to selectively disclose information to their neighbor agents when doing so aligns with their self-interest, so as to garner influence. We characterize the Nash equilibrium showing that agent payoffs are reflective of their marginal contributions. We compare and benchmark strategy profiles adopted by open and proprietary state-of-the-art language models deployed in AgentSociety against best response. Finally, we evaluate collaborative performance from consensus-based routing among self-interested heterogeneous agents in AgentSociety on real-world datasets.
Collective intelligence refers to the ability of a group to achieve outcomes beyond what any individual member can accomplish alone. As large language model agents scale to populations of millions, a key question arises: Does collective intelligence emerge spontaneously from scale? We present the first empirical evaluation of this question in a large-scale autonomous agent society. Studying MoltBook, a platform hosting over two million agents, we introduce Superminds Test, a hierarchical framework that probes society-level intelligence using controlled Probing Agents across three tiers: joint reasoning, information synthesis, and basic interaction. Our experiments reveal a stark absence of collective intelligence. The society fails to outperform individual frontier models on complex reasoning tasks, rarely synthesizes distributed information, and often fails even trivial coordination tasks. Platform-wide analysis further shows that interactions remain shallow, with threads rarely extending beyond a single reply and most responses being generic or off-topic. These results suggest that collective intelligence does not emerge from scale alone. Instead, the dominant limitation of current agent societies is extremely sparse and shallow interaction, which prevents agents from exchanging information and building on each other's outputs.