cs.MAJun 2, 2026

Capability Advertisement as a Market for Lemons: A Trust Layer for Heterogeneous Agent Networks

Authors: Gaurav Naresh Mittal

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) agents have begun to delegate work to one another. Protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and the Agent2Agent protocol (A2A) let an agent publish what it can do and let others call it, and public registries of such agents are already appearing. These protocols assume an advertised capability is a static, truthful fact. A real agent is none of these things: its competence is probabilistic, varies with input, drifts when the underlying model is updated, and, because the agent is itself a language model, it can describe itself with complete confidence and be wrong. A caller therefore sees what an agent claims to do, not what it can do, with no principled way to tell a reliable provider from a fluent impostor. We argue these difficulties share one cause: the market for lemons. When quality is hidden and claims are cheap, good and bad providers become indistinguishable, honest reliability goes unrewarded, and the market decays toward its worst participants. Economics offers three remedies, signaling, screening, and reputation, and none are present in today's agent protocols. We make four contributions: (1) a failure taxonomy that names confident-wrong as a non-adversarial, correlated subclass of Byzantine faults that classical fault-tolerance mismodels; (2) a market-for-lemons model showing that faith-based protocols admit only a low-trust equilibrium; (3) the Trust Layer, a thin, protocol-agnostic narrow waist above MCP and A2A that adds probabilistic capability descriptors, screening, and reputation, and admits a separating equilibrium when the cost of sustaining an overclaim exceeds the gain from it; and (4) a reliability-composition bound for delegation chains with an end-to-end placement argument. The design needs no model retraining and degrades gracefully when its trust anchors are absent or corrupt.

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