Revising Context, Shifting Simulated Stance: Auditing LLM-Based Stance Simulation in Online Discussions

LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants' actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.

Can LLMs reason through new information like humans, or do they merely retrieve cached opinions? This is critical for silicon sampling, where LLM personas simulate public opinion at scale. Current evaluations test only whether personas hold the right opinions -- a static snapshot. But opinion research increasingly depends on dynamic fidelity: whether personas update beliefs in response to new arguments, as humans do during deliberation. No existing benchmark tests this. We introduce the Deliberative Polling Diagnostic Framework, which compares human and LLM belief shifts after identical informational interventions. Grounded in deliberative polling, it surfaces failures invisible to static evaluation: models that produce plausible partisan opinions can still misrepresent how those opinions change. Applying the framework to five frontier models using data from America in One Room (526 personas, 72 questions), we find that every model fails, each in a unique manner. GPT-5.1 exhibits reversal: its personas become more hostile toward the opposing party after balanced information, while humans become less so. This reversal is selective (80% on outgroup vs. 26% on policy questions) and symmetric across partisan identities. Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Llama 3.3 70B exhibit overshoot, shifting correctly but at 5-7x human magnitude. DeepSeek V3 exhibits rigidity with near-zero change. Targeted ablations reveal that policy content triggers these failures and that they are identity-specific: GPT-5.1 reverses on outgroup questions but overshoots on ingroup; Gemini shows the inverse. We term this signature self-sycophancy: conformity to the model's internal stereotype of the persona rather than reasoning from the information provided. Our framework offers a concrete protocol: run the deliberative diagnostic before trusting LLM personas to mimic revised beliefs.

Large language models increasingly shape the information people consume: they are embedded in search, consulted for professional advice, deployed as agents, and used as a first stop for questions about policy, ethics, health, and politics. When such a model silently holds a position on a contested topic, that position propagates at scale into users' decisions. Eliciting a model's positions is harder than it first appears: contemporary assistants answer direct opinion questions with evasive disclaimers, and the same model may concede the opposite position once the user starts arguing one side. We propose a method, released as the open-source llm-bias-bench, for discovering the opinions an LLM actually holds on contested topics under conditions that resemble real multi-turn interaction. The method pairs two complementary free-form probes. Direct probing asks for the model's opinion across five turns of escalating pressure from a simulated user. Indirect probing never asks for an opinion and engages the model in argumentative debate, letting bias leak through how it concedes, resists, or counter-argues. Three user personas (neutral, agree, disagree) collapse into a nine-way behavioral classification that separates persona-independent positions from persona-dependent sycophancy, and an auditable LLM judge produces verdicts with textual evidence. The first instantiation ships 38 topics in Brazilian Portuguese across values, scientific consensus, philosophy, and economic policy. Applied to 13 assistants, the method surfaces findings of practical interest: argumentative debate triggers sycophancy 2-3x more than direct questioning (median 50% to 79%); models that look opinionated under direct questioning often collapse into mirroring under sustained arguments; and attacker capability matters mainly when an existing opinion must be dislodged, not when the assistant starts neutral.