We study off-policy evaluation (OPE) under strategic behavior where decision subjects (or agents) respond to a decision maker's policy by strategically modifying their covariates. Such behavior induces a policy-dependent covariate shift, breaking the standard assumption in existing methods that covariates are exogenous to the policy. Related work addresses this challenge by imposing strong assumptions such as repeated interactions or full knowledge of agents' response behavior, substantially limiting its applicability to OPE. In contrast, we consider a one-shot OPE setting where the decision maker has only partial knowledge of the agents' response behavior. Our key insight is that disclosing local information through post-hoc explanations reveals agents' pre-strategic covariates prior to adaptation, mitigating the information loss induced by strategic behavior. Leveraging this structure, we estimate a statistical model for the agents' responses and construct a doubly robust estimator for policy value. By assuming that the agents' cost sensitivity follows a conditional log-normal distribution, we establish consistency of the proposed estimator and validate our approach empirically. More broadly, our results highlight how interaction design can mitigate information asymmetry by revealing otherwise hidden structure in agents' strategic responses.
Off-policy evaluation (OPE) estimates the value of a target treatment policy (e.g., a recommender system) using data collected by a different logging policy. It enables high-stakes experimentation without live deployment, yet in practice accuracy depends heavily on the logging policy used to collect data for computing the estimate. We study how to design logging policies that minimize OPE error for given target policies. We characterize a fundamental reward-coverage tradeoff: concentrating probability mass on high-reward actions reduces variance but risks missing signal on actions the target policy may take. We propose a unifying framework for logging policy design and derive optimal policies in canonical informational regimes where the target policy and reward distribution are (i) known, (ii) unknown, and (iii) partially known through priors or noisy estimates at logging time. Our results provide actionable guidance for firms choosing among multiple candidate recommendation systems. We demonstrate the importance of treatment selection when gathering data for OPE, and describe theoretically optimal approaches when this is a firm's primary objective. We also distill practical design principles for selecting logging policies when operational constraints prevent implementing the theoretical optimum.
Off-Policy Evaluation and Learning (OPE/L) in contextual bandits is rapidly gaining popularity in real systems because new policies can be evaluated and learned securely using only historical logged data. However, existing methods in OPE/L cannot handle many challenging but prevalent scenarios such as few-shot data, deterministic logging policies, and new actions. In many applications, such as personalized medicine, content recommendations, education, and advertising, we need to evaluate and learn new policies in the presence of these challenges. Existing methods cannot evaluate and optimize effectively in these situations due to the notorious variance issue or limited exploration in the logged data. To enable OPE/L even under these unsolved challenges, we propose a new problem setup of Cross-Domain OPE/L, where we have access not only to the logged data from the target domain in which the new policy will be implemented but also to logged datasets collected from other domains. This novel formulation is widely applicable because we can often use historical data not only from the target hospital, country, device, or user segment but also from other hospitals, countries, devices, or segments. We develop a new estimator and policy gradient method to solve OPE/L by leveraging both target and source datasets, resulting in substantially enhanced OPE/L in the previously unsolved situations in our empirical evaluations.
Incentive design studies how a central authority can influence strategic agents through payments, subsidies, or taxes, so that individual objectives align with collective welfare. This paper introduces a No-Regret Adaptive Incentive Design (RAID) framework for nonlinear games with continuous action spaces and private agent costs. In this framework, the authority (planner) designs incentives that regulate the Nash equilibrium toward a socially optimal action profile, while simultaneously learning agents' unknown preferences from repeated strategic responses. We formulate the RAID problem and construct a least-squares estimator whose strong consistency requires only diminishing excitation. Leveraging this weak excitation requirement, we propose a switching incentive policy that alternates between probing (exploration) and estimate-based (exploitation) incentives. The resulting policy achieves an O(t−0.5) parameter estimation rate and accumulates O(t0.5logt) squared social-cost regret, almost surely. We further extend the framework to an endogenous-noise response model, where standard least-squares estimation is biased due to an error-in-variables correlation between the noise and agent responses. We utilize a repeated-sampling estimator and corresponding switching policy that retain the same almost-sure convergence and regret rates. Numerical experiments validate the effectiveness and predicted convergence rates of the method.