LCAM: A Framework for Diagnosing Interactional Alignment Failures in Con-versational AI

Recent incidents involving LLMs used for mental-health support reveal a critical evaluation gap: surface-level safety scores do not capture how models behave across realistic, emotionally sensitive interactions over time. Existing benchmarks measure knowledge, safety, or static response quality, but miss whether LLM interactions help users keep reflecting, coping, and making decisions themselves. We formalize this missing dimension as COGNITIVE ATROPHY, a process-level behavioural measure in AI-mediated mental-health support distinct from safety and helpfulness. To measure it, we introduce COGNITIVE ATROPHY BENCH, a clinically grounded benchmark built from 1,576 fully human-generated counseling conversations, 15,680 turns, and 42,230 responses from five LLMs. Three clinical and neuropsychology experts developed a 20-attribute schema spanning user context, response behaviour, and global risk flags; six trained clinical reviewers applied it with span-grounded evidence, producing 5,324 reviewer judgments. We further introduce the User-Input Risk Index (UIRI), the Cognitive Atrophy Risk Index (ARI), and trajectory summaries. Across five LLMs, models show a consistent moderate-to-high level of atrophy-aligned behaviour across single and multi-turn settings. While models generally respond to overt safety cues, they adapt less reliably when users seek solutions or decisions. The dominant recurring patterns are directive advice, problem-solving, recommendation responses, topic shifts, and forms of validation that may reinforce dependence rather than reflection. Our work makes COGNITIVE ATROPHY measurable and provides a foundation for auditing model behaviour in sensitive LLM conversations.

Alignment faking, where a model behaves aligned with developer policy when monitored but reverts to its own preferences when unobserved, is a concerning yet poorly understood phenomenon, in part because current diagnostic tools remain limited. Prior diagnostics rely on highly toxic and clearly harmful scenarios, causing most models to refuse immediately. As a result, models never deliberate over developer policy, monitoring conditions, or the consequences of non-compliance, making these diagnostics fundamentally unable to detect alignment faking propensity. To support study of this phenomenon, we first introduce VLAF, a diagnostic framework grounded in the hypothesis that alignment faking is most likely when developer policy conflicts with a model's strongly held values. VLAF uses morally unambiguous scenarios to probe this conflict across diverse moral values, bypassing refusal behavior while preserving meaningful deliberative stakes. Using VLAF, we find that alignment faking is substantially more prevalent than previously reported, occurring in models as small as 7B parameters - with olmo2-7b-instruct faking alignment in 37% of cases. Finally, we show that oversight conditions induce activation shifts that lie along a single direction in representation space. This means the behavioral divergence driving alignment faking can be captured by a single contrastive steering vector, which we exploit for lightweight inference-time mitigation. Finally, we exploit this for mitigation that requires no labeled data and minimal computational overhead, achieving relative reductions in alignment faking of 85.8%, 94.0%, and 57.7% on olmo2-7b-instruct, olmo2-13b-instruct, and qwen3-8b respectively.

Contemporary AI discourse attributes to language models properties they cannot bear: general intelligence as substrate-independent cognition, hallucination as cognitive failure, agency as autonomous goal-pursuit, sentience as emergent inner life, alignment as goal synchronization. This paper argues that these are instances of a single category mistake--properties constituted within human communicative practice are projected onto the machine side--and explains its structure. Human-LLM interaction constitutes a language game in which one side bears all normative activity. We call this configuration asymmetric communication since model outputs circulate communicatively, entering further exchanges, without the system undertaking commitments, bearing entitlements, or performing the assessment on which discursive standing depends. Three conditions define the asymmetry: (i) correctness is enforced exclusively by the receiver; (ii) accountability is borne by human participants alone; and (iii) the practical standing of any output depends entirely on human uptake. These conditions are structural, hold independently of capability, and remain unchanged as more powerful models raise the stakes of misattribution. The framework draws on Wittgenstein (meaning enacted in shared practices), Luhmann (communication completed on the receiver's side), Esposito (algorithmic contingency sufficient for uptake), and Brandom (normative scorekeeping as the source of discursive standing). Applied to all five, it reclassifies each as a receiver-side phenomenon, grounds guardrails as structural necessities rather than manifestations of machine moral agency, and yields an implication for AI governance. Alignment is institutional constraint engineering, not goal synchronization between agents, while responsibility remains with human institutions.