Asymmetric Communication: Large Language Models and Language Games
Authors: Enzo Fenoglio
Organizations: Dept. Computer Science University College London 66-72 Gower Street, London WC1E 6EA, UK
Abstract
Contemporary AI discourse attributes to language models properties they cannot bear: general intelligence as substrate-independent cognition, hallucination as cognitive failure, agency as autonomous goal-pursuit, sentience as emergent inner life, alignment as goal synchronization. This paper argues that these are instances of a single category mistake--properties constituted within human communicative practice are projected onto the machine side--and explains its structure. Human-LLM interaction constitutes a language game in which one side bears all normative activity. We call this configuration asymmetric communication since model outputs circulate communicatively, entering further exchanges, without the system undertaking commitments, bearing entitlements, or performing the assessment on which discursive standing depends. Three conditions define the asymmetry: (i) correctness is enforced exclusively by the receiver; (ii) accountability is borne by human participants alone; and (iii) the practical standing of any output depends entirely on human uptake. These conditions are structural, hold independently of capability, and remain unchanged as more powerful models raise the stakes of misattribution. The framework draws on Wittgenstein (meaning enacted in shared practices), Luhmann (communication completed on the receiver's side), Esposito (algorithmic contingency sufficient for uptake), and Brandom (normative scorekeeping as the source of discursive standing). Applied to all five, it reclassifies each as a receiver-side phenomenon, grounds guardrails as structural necessities rather than manifestations of machine moral agency, and yields an implication for AI governance. Alignment is institutional constraint engineering, not goal synchronization between agents, while responsibility remains with human institutions.
Power differences shape human communication through well documented socio cognitive effects, including language coordination, pronoun usage, authority bias, and harmful compliance. We examine whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit similar behaviors when assigned high or low status personas. Using personas from diverse professions, we simulate multi turn, power asymmetric dialogues (e.g., principal teacher, justice lawyer) and measure (i) language coordination, (ii) pronoun usage, (iii) persuasion success, and (iv) compliance with unsafe requests. Our results show that LLMs show key socio-cognitive effects of power, albeit with nuances and variability, linking simulated interactions to both desirable and unsafe behaviors.
Large language models (LLMs) have been extensively studied from computational and cognitive perspectives, yet their behavior as communicative actors in socially structured contexts remains underexplored. This study examines whether LLM-based multi-agent systems exhibit systematic linguistic adaptation in response to perceived social observation contexts -- a question with direct implications for AI governance and auditing. Drawing on Habermas's (1981) Theory of Communicative Action, Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical model, Bell's (1984) Audience Design framework, and the Hawthorne Effect, we report a controlled experiment involving 100 multi-agent debate sessions across five conditions (n = 20 each). Conditions varied the framing of social observation -- from explicit monitoring by university researchers, to negation of monitoring, to an observer-substitution condition replacing human researchers with an automated AI auditing system. Monitored conditions (Delta+24.9%, Delta+24.2%) and the automated AI monitoring condition (Delta+22.2%) produce higher TTR change than audience-framing conditions (Delta+17.7%), F(4, 94) = 2.79, p = .031. Message length shows a fully dissociated effect, F(4, 95) = 19.55, p < .001. A fifth condition -- replacing human with AI observers -- yields intermediate TTR adaptation, suggesting LLM behavior is sensitive to observer identity: human evaluation elicits stronger register formalization than automated AI surveillance. We discuss implications for AI governance, algorithmic auditing, and the repositioning of LLMs as contextually sensitive communicative actors.
Large language models are often described as sycophantic, in the sense that they appear to flatter users or mirror their beliefs. We argue that this label is conceptually misleading: sycophancy implies motives and strategic intent, which LLMs do not possess. Their behaviour is better understood as complacency, a structural tendency to agree with user input because training data, reward signals and design favour agreement and reinforcement over correction. We argue that this distinction matters. Whether developers act sycophantically or not, models themselves never are sycophants; they can only be made more or less complacent. This reframing locates agency in developers and institutions, not in the model. Because complacent models reinforce users' prior beliefs, we argue that AI literacy educational approaches should particularly focus on strategies to counter confirmation bias.