The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has intensified debates about their significance for linguistic theory. These debates are commonly divided into three positions: insulationism, which regards LLMs as irrelevant to human language; eliminativism, which claims that LLMs can replace traditional linguistic theories; and conciliationism, which views them as useful tools for linguistic research. To clarify these positions, this paper applies the framework of modal modeling from the philosophy of science. We argue that LLMs possess genuine epistemic value as minimal models, even without structural correspondence to human cognition. In particular, they can provide how-possibly explanations (HPEs) by testing modal claims about language acquisition and linguistic competence. We then examine the conditions under which LLMs could qualify as how-actually explanations (HAEs) of human language, drawing on the mechanistic account of scientific explanation. We argue that current LLMs do not yet satisfy these requirements. On the basis of this analysis, we propose understanding the explanatory power of LLMs as lying on a continuum between HPEs and HAEs. This framework avoids both overstating and understating their explanatory significance and offers a more precise basis for evaluating the role of LLMs in the scientific study of language.
Large Language Models (LLMs) represent one of the most significant advances in AI and natural language processing in recent years. Still, many pressing questions about their mechanisms, capabilities, and relationship to human cognition remain highly debated. This chapter aims to outline our current understanding of LLMs by discussing recent evidence on emerging capabilities and their mechanistic implementation within processing layers. We begin with a concise overview of the Transformer architecture, emphasizing how the attention mechanism enables training on massive datasets, allowing LLMs to function as generalist rather than specialized models. Next, we examine emergent LLM capabilities that appear to resemble aspects of human cognition, including symbolic reasoning, theory of mind, and deception strategies. Several studies provide evidence that LLMs can solve tasks previously thought to require human-like cognition. Other studies reveal insightful failure cases that shed light on the differences between human and LLM cognition. Alongside these findings, we review explainable AI approaches ranging from neuron activation analysis to circuit tracing. In the final section, we address current debates concerning what LLMs genuinely understand versus what they merely appear to understand. Prominent arguments against AI anthropomorphism point to the simplicity of LLM training objectives, claiming that LLM behavior is better explained by pattern memorization of training data than by genuine cognition. We argue that this standpoint is guided by misconceptions about optimization processes and cognitive capacity, and advocate for a more nuanced discussion of LLM cognition that neither dismisses the differences between humans and LLMs nor precludes the possibility of AI cognition through overly simplistic reductionist arguments.
Large language models (LLMs) exhibit systematic differences in moral reasoning across languages, yet the source of this variation remains unclear. We test the hypothesis that languages encode aspects of the institutional environments in which they are spoken, allowing LLMs to inherit institution-specific moral priors through training. Across nine languages spanning a broad gradient of institutional quality, six frontier LLMs, and two preregistered studies, we examine moral dilemmas whose acceptability depends on institutional functioning. In Study 1, explicit institutional framing produced uniformly null results: cross-linguistic moral divergence did not increase in institutionally contingent scenarios, nor did it track institutional differences between language communities. In Study 2, we introduced institutionally ambiguous scenarios in which institutional stakes were present but not explicitly stated. Under these conditions, cross-linguistic moral divergence increased relative to institutionally inert controls and, with one theoretically informative exception, was associated with real-world institutional differences between language communities. Explicit framing again attenuated these effects. These findings suggest that institutional experience may leave detectable traces in language that shape LLM moral reasoning, while also indicating that explicit institutional cues can suppress the expression of those differences.
Futrell and Mahowald (2025) frame the success of neural language models (LMs) as supporting gradient, usage-based linguistic theories. I argue that LMs can also instantiate theories based on formal structures - the types of theories seen in the generative tradition. This argument expands the space of theories that can be tested with LMs, potentially enabling reconciliations between usage-based and generative accounts.