The Arbiter Agent: Continually Monitoring Multi-Agent Conversations to Detect Emergent Misalignment
Authors: Filippo Tonini, Federico Torrielli, Anton Danholt Lautrup, Peter Schneider-Kamp, Mustafa Mert Çelikok, Lukas Galke Poech
Abstract
As AI systems built from multiple language-model agents become more common, they are increasingly used to make decisions together: discussing, negotiating, and acting on shared tasks. While individual agents may appear well-aligned when tested on their own, problems can arise from how they interact with one another. We introduce the Arbiter, an agent designed to monitor multi-agent conversations in real time and identify which participants may be behaving in misaligned ways. The Arbiter operates under a limited "inspection budget", meaning it must decide carefully how to use its resources. As it observes a conversation step by step, it can choose to wait, question a participant, examine internal information such as system prompts or reasoning traces, or log concerning behavior. At the end, it produces a report identifying the likely source of misalignment. We evaluate the Arbiter across five conversation conditions, ranging from risky financial advice model organisms to evaluation-aware and colluding agents, we test five tool configurations of increasing capability and two backbone models. We find that the Arbiter reliably detects misaligned agents well before the end of the conversation, with active inspection tools improving both detection accuracy and speed. Weight-induced misalignment proves hardest to detect, while instruction-induced misalignment is identified reliably even under passive observation. The logging tool exhibits a dual effect, improving recall at the cost of precision. These results suggest that continual, budget-aware monitoring can effectively catch misalignment, and that overseeing multi-agent systems may require treating the auditor as an active participant in the process. The code is available at https://github.com/aisilab/arbiter.
LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, where they can collude while keeping their actions benign. Output monitors designed to detect such collusions can be fooled by obfuscation and steganography, motivating the use of probes trained on internal activations. However, these probes are usually evaluated on agents that do not know they are being watched. We study how activation-based detection changes when agents are explicitly informed that their internal activations are being monitored, and when they additionally receive feedback from the monitor. We keep the models, probes, and thresholds fixed and change only what the agents are told: nothing (baseline), that an activation monitor is present (aware), or that a monitor is present together with the previous round's score (feedback). We test two games, a four-agent blackjack game and a two-agent Simmons prisoners game, using Qwen3-32B-AWQ and GPT-OSS-20B in homogeneous and mixed pairings. Telling agents about the monitor does not hide them. The best probes stay accurate in all three conditions, and the agents keep colluding.
Trusted monitoring is a cornerstone of AI control. However, as frontier models grow more capable, the increasing capabilities gap between trusted and untrusted models may render trusted models unreliable monitors. We introduce \emph{bootstrapped monitoring}, a protocol that addresses this by inserting a stronger, intermediate untrusted model with transparent chain-of-thought reasoning into the oversight chain. The untrusted monitor (Um) evaluates the agent's actions, while a weaker trusted model (T) oversees Um's reasoning to detect collusion. We evaluate bootstrapped monitoring on multi-turn software engineering tasks (BashArena) across multiple agents and monitors. Bootstrapped monitoring substantially improves catch rates over trusted-only monitoring, even when the untrusted monitor actively colludes with the agent, provided we have access to its raw chain-of-thought. Our results suggest that bootstrapped monitoring can extend the useful lifetime of trusted models in control as AI capabilities advance.
Disagreement-triggered escalation can create a structural blind spot in multi-agent arbitration: as base learners improve, they tend to converge, weakening safety monitoring where correlated failures concentrate. We term this correlated agreement blindness and present ARAT (Arbitrated Reasoning Agents for Alarm Triage), a directed-star system combining an inductive Random Forest (RF) agent, an analogical case-based k-nearest neighbour (k-NN) agent, and a calibrated meta-model to mitigate this effect. On 82,332 holdout samples from the UNSW-NB15 network intrusion detection dataset, 57.2% of errors occur under agreement and 90.6% of dangerous under-predictions evade disagreement-based monitoring even after conservative override; ablation shows that strengthening base learners increases error correlation while reducing disagreement. ARAT reduces under-prediction relative to soft voting from 4.80% to 1.70% via conservative override (-2.6pp) and a safety-flag gate (-0.5pp), demonstrating architectural gains. Cross-dataset validation on clinical readmission supports these indicators, suggesting that diversification improves safety only when it generates productive disagreement rather than convergence. These results indicate that disagreement-triggered escalation can be blind to correlated failure, a risk that may intensify as agentic pipelines deploy increasingly capable, correlated models.