On the Reliability of Networks of AI Agents: Density Evolution, Stopping Sets, and Architecture Optimization

Communication allows large language model agents to pool evidence, but it also creates paths along which an erroneous claim can spread. We formulate a correction-aware network model that tracks susceptible, exposed, infectious, and corrected agents and derive its early-invasion condition for heterogeneous communication networks. We then couple this propagation model to an analytic majority-vote benchmark in which a clean-task reliability target imposes a minimum connectivity requirement. Under fixed exposure per communication edge, reliability and error control impose opposing graph constraints. We characterize when their intersection is empty and when it contains an intermediate connectivity range, and identify regular graphs that attain the smallest invasion factor within the reliable graph class when such graphs exist. Under a fixed sender budget, the homogeneous first-order threshold is independent of network density, showing that the communication-budget convention determines whether added edges increase early propagation risk. Finite-network simulations on 21,000 trajectories illustrate these directional predictions. A controlled grok-4.3 experiment then evaluates three six-node topologies on 36 new closed-world tasks, with a balanced 12-task subset continued to full cascades. Mean first-generation offspring increased from 0.667 to 1.333 and 1.667 as degree increased from 2 to 4 and 5, while the adoption fraction among exposed neighbours remained 0.333. Mean non-seed erroneous adoption in the full-cascade subset was 0.200, 0.333, and 0.333. Together, these results provide a tractable basis for selecting connectivity under explicit reliability and propagation constraints.

Compositional reliability bounds for multi-agent systems multiply component reliabilities, a step licensed by a conditional-independence assumption that is routinely stated and rarely tested. We test it. Two instances of one model, in a two-agent handoff, co-fail on 90.0% of the missions on which either fails (log OR 6.66, 95% CI [6.38, 7.00]; phi 0.916), in a preregistered evaluation of 18,000 missions scored by deterministic code with no LLM judge. Substituting a different model reduces the association in six of six contrasts; substituting a different vendor, model already different, does not -- a registered hypothesis reported as a null. The error is signed and runs against the operator: positive dependence inflates joint failure above the independence product, so redundancy is over-credited exactly when components share a model. The assumption-free alternative is often vacuous, and fitting a dependence model is worse: we prove a bootstrap bound on a fitted model's functional loses coverage of the truth as n grows, the identification gap being O(1) while the bootstrap haircut is O(n^{-1/2}). More data makes such a certificate worse, with no visible symptom. We give a finite-sample certificate assuming no dependence structure: a linear program over the joint, over a Bonferroni-Clopper-Pearson box around measured co-execution moments. It is sound, sharp for the information supplied, and monotone in the moment family. Enriching ten moment functionals to fourteen narrows the identified interval by 85.7% and lifts the certified floor from 0.2455 to 0.4116. A companion anytime-valid certificate holds type-I error at 0.0471 under optional stopping. Common dependence statistics are marginal-bounded and can reverse an apparent ordering of conditions when the compared agents fail at different rates. Contracts, scoring code, analysis scripts, and the preregistration are released.

Multi-step enterprise agent tasks fail in a characteristic way: single-pass inference has no checkpoint between deciding an answer and committing to it. We study one production system (Leni) whose architecture installs such checkpoints: verification loops (execute, observe, compare, correct) staffed by lightweight task-specialized post-trained models. We evaluate the unmodified production configuration on three public benchmarks stressing distinct failure modes: SpreadsheetBench Verified (silent computation error), BullshitBench v2 (premise confabulation), and the GAIA validation split (cascade error over long tool chains). The full system improves over its frontier base model by +11.0 percentage points on SpreadsheetBench (91.25% vs 80.25%, n=400, p<0.001), +7 to +10 percentage points on BullshitBench (98% vs 91%, n=100), and roughly +15 points on GAIA validation (75.2% pass@1, n=165; 83.0% best-of-k). Our central contribution is a decomposition of that uplift: most of it comes from scaffolding, routing, and specialist models rather than from the verification step itself, whose isolated contribution is small (+1.5 points) but concentrated at the top of the score distribution, where it converts otherwise-failing tasks. We instrument the loop end-to-end, yielding an empirical verifier confusion matrix (catch rate about 0.20, fix rate 0.75, no false-alarm regressions) that grounds a compounding-reliability model. Specialist-swap ablations suggest that the loop's value depends on who observes it: replacing the small trained verifier with the generating frontier model eliminates most rescues. A valid-premise control shows zero over-rejections in 100 expert-level questions.