A self-determining system is defined as one in which causes originating within the system influence the system itself. This definition raises the question of how to specify system boundaries. Although the concept of "closure" is commonly used for this purpose, defining boundaries solely in terms of causal relations introduce challenges, such as how to handle external causes and circular causality. To address this issue, we introduce two types of asymmetric relations: causal and constitutive. We propose that system boundaries can be defined as closures of loops formed by these relations, referred to as causal-constitutive loops. By constraining constitutive relations, the resulting system necessarily includes internal causes and thereby satisfies self-determination. Furthermore, to prevent reduction to supervenience, constitutive relations must involve at least two independent variables. This minimal requirement leads to two interdependent loops, which implies a dual-process organization.
Agency is often invoked in research on philosophy, biology, and cognitive science without a clear account of how it originates from material organization. Building on temporally parametrized (F, A)-systems, this paper develops a graded organizational theory of agency grounded in relational biology, physical biosemiotics, and process ontology. We argue that self-referential closure cannot be adequately conceived outside time: once the constitutive processes of a semantically closed organization are associated with distinct characteristic timescales, the organization unfolds into an out-of-sync dependency structure that can be formally redescribed as a history-dependent, revisable Asynchronous Dynamic Bayesian Network. This move allows for a principled distinction between autonomy, goal-directedness, agency, and open-endedness. Autonomy arises from precarious closure to efficient causation under material openness; goal-directedness from the maintenance of viability-supporting organization; agency appears when such organization acquires an endogenous anticipatory structure that selectively modulates organism-environment coupling in light of possible futures; open-endedness begins when this anticipatory organization can reconstruct its own future space of possibilities. Our framework reconciles Rosennean anticipation with organizational closure, restricts Markov blankets and active inference to derived formal redescriptions rather than first principles, and reinterprets computational enactivism in non-Fristonian terms. By deriving weaker temporalized organizations, our contribution outlines a hierarchy from proto-agential chemical systems to fully semantically closed agents, with implications for multicellular organisms, synthetic lifeforms, and neuroscience.
Why do some physical systems possess consciousness, while others do not? A scientific theory of consciousness must explain differences in system behavior in terms of well-defined internal mechanisms. However, many existing approaches introduce higher-level structural or informational descriptions without specifying how these structures contribute to the generation of behavior, raising the concern that they may become theoretically ineffective.A further difficulty arises from the status of causation. Attempts to introduce causally effective mental states appear to conflict with physical theory, while strictly physicalist accounts risk excluding higher-level causation altogether. We argue that this dilemma stems from a conflation of physical determination with causation. To address this issue, we distinguish between two complementary descriptive frameworks: the physical stance and the causal stance. While the physical stance represents systems in terms of state evolution, the causal stance introduces asymmetric relations that enable the explicit representation of internal mechanisms. We show that causal descriptions provide a more constrained and informative representation of internal structure and cannot, in general, be reconstructed from physical descriptions alone. Within this framework, we define mental causation in terms of intrinsic causes and propose the Dual-Laws Model (DLM), which explicitly implements whole-to-parts causal mechanisms. This approach provides a principled way to model the causal role of consciousness without violating physical determinism.
Pearl's structural causal model (SCM) framework, built on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and the do-calculus, is the dominant formal language for causal reasoning. Yet it carries two structural restrictions: every relationship must be pre-specified as a directed causal edge, and feedback cycles are forbidden. This paper examines two classes of phenomena that strain these restrictions. First, symmetric physical and economic constraints, the ideal gas law being the canonical case, carry no intrinsic causal direction. Direction emerges only under intervention, and which variable is solved for must be specified as part of the intervention. We formalize such constraints as causal zeros within an Extended Causal Model by adding an activation operator, subject to local solvability and graph-admissibility conditions. Second, for the class of finite-propagation state-space systems considered here, we treat apparent instantaneous cycles as artifacts of suppressed time and ground both causal zeros and feedback in Causal Differential Equations (CDEs). In these, the transient regime is a time-unrolled acyclic causal process, and causal zeros arise as the defining functions of attracting equilibrium manifolds; periodic and chaotic attractors define further regimes of the same dynamics, treated through attractor-relative intervention. We give the extended do-calculus, identifiability conditions, counterfactual semantics, and open problems.