LLM and Human Modes of Representation

LLMs are widely regarded as alien intelligences, systems whose cognitive operations are fundamentally unlike our own. Apparent similarities to human cognition are therefore often seen as the result of anthropomorphic projection. We argue that this framing is mistaken. LLMs clearly differ from humans in important respects, including their physical substrate, learning history, and the environments with which they interact. These differences make it all the more striking that contemporary LLM-based systems converge with human cognition on a number of principles of cognitive organization with longstanding support in cognitive science. We identify structural correspondences across five dimensions: inferential organization, computational architecture, representational structure, prediction-driven learning, and reinforcement-learning-like mechanisms supporting goal-directed action. These correspondences support a broader model of intelligent cognition in which core principles long used to explain human intelligence also characterize contemporary LLM-based systems.

Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.

A major question in cognitive modeling concerns the behavioral alignment between large language models and humans across linguistic and non-linguistic tasks. Unlike standard LLMs, large reasoning models (LRMs) are optimized with reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards, encouraging correct solutions to reasoning tasks rather than preference-aligned responses. Recent work (de Varda et al., 2025) investigates the cost of thinking in humans and LRMs by comparing human reaction times with model reasoning traces across a range of reasoning tasks. We isolate this alignment by turning to abductive reasoning: unlike deductive tasks, its difficulty cannot be inferred from formal structure and offers no shortcuts a model could exploit to mimic effort without genuine search, providing firmer ground for empirical claims of shared effort. We find further evidence of alignment between LRM and human reasoning effort, as well as evidence that models and humans tend to make similar errors. Finally, we show that decoding methods that let models explore multiple reasoning paths increase alignment in reasoning cost between humans and LRMs across the three models tested.