A Fast Convergent Algorithm for Solving Non-convex Partially-Decoupled Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

We introduce a novel Divide and Conquer control design methodology leveraging differential games in single-agent, multi-objective dynamical systems. The proposed framework associates each control objective with a virtual input and establishes a non-cooperative, finite or infinite horizon differential game among representative players. Each player optimizes a distinct virtual cost function tailored to its specific goal, the full system state, and the other virtual inputs, while accounting for the remaining players' optimal policies. By establishing a Nash Equilibrium for this game, we synthesize a composite controller that achieves a stable balance across competing objectives, providing control engineers with an intuitive and modular framework for parameter re-tuning throughout the design cycle. We provide formal mathematical derivations for both continuous-time and discrete-time dynamical systems, targeting large-scale single-agent applications where complex, dynamically conflicting control objectives make global weighting intractable. To demonstrate the methodology, we developed an open-source Python package implementing a novel numerical algorithm for solving Coupled Algebraic Riccati Equations arising in infinite-horizon differential games. We evaluate the approach on two benchmark case studies: an inverted pendulum on a cart and a non-linear hierarchically controlled quadrotor. The resulting closed-loop performance is compared against the classical Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) across various transient and steady-state control metrics, demonstrating superior trajectory tracking and robust multi-objective regulation.

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are scalable to large games and have convergence guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, they do not guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. We present an approach for exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer imperfect-information games that solves a quadratically-constrained program based on a nonlinear complementarity problem formulation from the sequence-form game representation. This approach capitalizes on recent advances for solving nonconvex quadratic programs. Our algorithm is able to quickly solve three-player Kuhn poker after removal of dominated actions. Of the available algorithms in the Gambit software suite, only the logit quantal response approach is successfully able to solve the game; however, the approach takes longer than our algorithm and also involves a degree of approximation. Our formulation also leads to a new approach for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games which we demonstrate to outperform a previous quadratically-constrained program formulation.

Concurrent games are a standard model for multi-agent systems, with Nash equilibrium as their central solution concept. The associated \emph{constrained existence problem}---does a game admit a Nash equilibrium whose expected payoff lies within a prescribed interval for every player?---is undecidable, and remains so even for 10-player \emph{stopping} games, in which a terminal state is reached almost surely under every strategy profile. We give two routes to tractability. We first relax exactness and consider the problem of approximate constrained existence problem, parametrised by $\varepsilon$-NE, which decides whether an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium with the prescribed payoffs exists. The algorithm runs in exponential time, and only polynomially in the bit-size of $\varepsilon$. We complement it with a \PSPACE-hardness lower bound that holds already for turn-based games, and for pure equilibria as well. We then relax the solution concept, turning to \emph{extreme risk-sensitive equilibria} (XRSE), recently introduced for turn-based stochastic games. Here the players are partitioned into optimists and pessimists, who evaluate a strategy profile by the best, respectively the worst, payoff attainable with positive probability, instead of the expected payoff. We prove that the constrained existence problem for XRSE is \NP-complete on concurrent games, as for turn-based games.