Solving multi-agent optimal control problems in aerospace such as pursuit-evasion and contested space operations can be modeled as non-convex differential games for which, there are limited algorithms. In this work, a relaxation of generalized Nash Equilibrium problems (GNEPs) to exclude inter-agent control coupling in dynamics, which is representative of many multi-agent systems is introduced. The main contribution is an algorithm for solving a broad class of differential games named FALCON: Fast Augmented Lagrangian Convexification for Open-loop Nash equilibria is presented. Methodologically, sequential convex programming (SCP) is utilized to create tractable convex sub-games which can then be solved via standard convex programming methods involving a potential game reformulation. FALCON is demonstrated to have global convergence guarantees to an open-loop Nash equilibrium for non-convex differential games under mild assumptions. This is numerically shown through both cooperative and competitive differential games.
We introduce a novel Divide and Conquer control design methodology leveraging differential games in single-agent, multi-objective dynamical systems. The proposed framework associates each control objective with a virtual input and establishes a non-cooperative, finite or infinite horizon differential game among representative players. Each player optimizes a distinct virtual cost function tailored to its specific goal, the full system state, and the other virtual inputs, while accounting for the remaining players' optimal policies. By establishing a Nash Equilibrium for this game, we synthesize a composite controller that achieves a stable balance across competing objectives, providing control engineers with an intuitive and modular framework for parameter re-tuning throughout the design cycle. We provide formal mathematical derivations for both continuous-time and discrete-time dynamical systems, targeting large-scale single-agent applications where complex, dynamically conflicting control objectives make global weighting intractable. To demonstrate the methodology, we developed an open-source Python package implementing a novel numerical algorithm for solving Coupled Algebraic Riccati Equations arising in infinite-horizon differential games. We evaluate the approach on two benchmark case studies: an inverted pendulum on a cart and a non-linear hierarchically controlled quadrotor. The resulting closed-loop performance is compared against the classical Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) across various transient and steady-state control metrics, demonstrating superior trajectory tracking and robust multi-objective regulation.
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) often arise in multi-agent engineering applications that require distributed algorithms. Unlike traditional approaches that enforce consensus on multipliers, our method removes the need to share multipliers, reducing communication and improving privacy. As a result, different initializations can lead to different GNEs, including non-variational ones. We establish convergence under sufficient conditions using an input-to-state stability (ISS) framework.
There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are scalable to large games and have convergence guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, they do not guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. We present an approach for exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer imperfect-information games that solves a quadratically-constrained program based on a nonlinear complementarity problem formulation from the sequence-form game representation. This approach capitalizes on recent advances for solving nonconvex quadratic programs. Our algorithm is able to quickly solve three-player Kuhn poker after removal of dominated actions. Of the available algorithms in the Gambit software suite, only the logit quantal response approach is successfully able to solve the game; however, the approach takes longer than our algorithm and also involves a degree of approximation. Our formulation also leads to a new approach for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games which we demonstrate to outperform a previous quadratically-constrained program formulation.