Two kinds of robustness are not the same: disentangling fault tolerance and low-SNR robustness in multi-domain event detection on real data

Cyber-physical system (CPS) forecasting models depend on sensor streams with noisy, biased, missing, or temporally misaligned readings, yet standard forecasting evaluation often selects models by nominal error without showing whether they remain robust under such faults. We introduce SensorFault-Bench, a shared CPS-grounded sensor-fault stress-test protocol for evaluating forecasting architectures and robustness-improvement methods, and an operational taxonomy organizing the method comparison. Across four real-world datasets and eight scored scenarios governed by a standardized severity model, it reports worst-scenario degradation, clean mean squared error (MSE), and worst-scenario fault-time MSE, separating relative robustness from absolute error. A disjoint fault-transfer split lets explicit fault-training methods train on adjacent fault families while evaluation uses separate benchmark scenarios. Empirically, forecasting architectures favored by clean MSE can degrade sharply under faults, and clean-MSE rankings can disagree with worst-scenario fault-time error rankings. Chronos-2, the evaluated zero-shot foundation-model representative, matches or trails the last-value naive forecaster in clean MSE on the two single-target datasets and has the largest worst-scenario degradation on ETTh1 and Traffic, where all channels are forecast targets. For the evaluated robustness-improvement method set, paired deltas show selective degradation reductions: projected gradient descent adversarial training and randomized training lead where value faults dominate observed degradation, while fault augmentation leads where availability faults dominate. SensorFault-Bench provides open-source code, documented data access, and reproduction and extension guides, so new datasets, architectures, and robustness-improvement methods can be evaluated under the same CPS sensor-fault robustness protocol.

Virtual sensing, the estimation of hard-to-measure quantities from available sensor measurements, is a critical enabler for control and monitoring in cyber-physical systems. However, when sensors fail, learning-based predictors can produce physically implausible estimates that propagate to system-level failures. We argue that real-world deployment demands robustness and introduce MuViS-C, the first multi-domain benchmark of robustness against common sensor failures in learning-based virtual sensing. Building on an existing nominal-performance benchmark and established corruption taxonomies, it covers ten sensor failure modes, from subtle drifts to catastrophic signal dropouts, at multiple severities. These are paired with complementary robustness measures capturing average error under corruption, relative degradation, and worst-case fragility. Across nine datasets from six domains, we benchmark six architectures spanning gradient-boosted trees and the major inductive biases for sequence modeling: convolution, recurrence, attention, and MLP-mixing. On the attention-based architecture, we further probe three robustification strategies. We find that (i) every model degrades substantially under corruption, becoming worse than a naïve predictor on at least one corruption setting, (ii) gradient-boosted tree ensembles achieve strong robustness, and (iii) dedicated robustification closes the gap between the attention-based architecture and the most robust models, though each strategy hurts nominal performance. The benchmark's multi-domain design proves essential, as model rankings shift across datasets, and no single domain captures the full robustness picture. MuViS-C is open-source and extensible to new datasets, failure modes, measures, and models.

Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems in industrial control systems (ICS) and operational technology (OT) environments are increasingly required to meet formal resilience criteria: absorbed adversarial disturbances, graceful degradation under sustained attack, and certified system-level guarantees. Existing resilience frameworks for cyber-physical systems define absorb-recover-adapt trajectories at the architectural level but do not treat machine learning anomaly detectors as first-class components, leaving a gap between component-level robustness evaluation and system-level resilience certification. In this paper, we establish that adversarial robustness in ICS anomaly detection is a specific instantiation of system resilience, and formalise this connection by mapping four resilience constructs, i.e. disturbance class, absorption capacity, recovery trajectory, and degradation function, onto the adversarial machine learning setting. We derive a compositional resilience bound for heterogeneous ICS detection networks, showing that the binding constraint on system-level resilience is the coupling-adjusted absorption capacity of each node along the attack path, not the per-node capacity -- so the binding node need not be the weakest one. Empirical validation on the BATADAL water distribution system benchmark demonstrates that the resulting metrics surface operationally significant phenomena invisible to standard benchmarks: the absorption-degradation divergence under adversarial training, and the paradox that hardening the binding node in isolation reduces system-level resilience. Implications for ICS architecture design and certification standards are discussed.