In practice, most commercial LLM providers do not publicly release details of underlying LLM architectures. However, prior work has shown that given limited API access to an LLM (namely, top-k logits and/or a logit bias function), one can recover certain architectural details of an LLM, such as the hidden dimension of the feed-forward network. Perhaps in response to these results, most commercial LLM providers have restricted their APIs to expose only the single logit for each decoded token, and they no longer give users the ability to bias logits. We show that even under current restrictive APIs, several architectural parameters are still recoverable. We present NightVision, an attack that uses restrictive black-box API access to estimate the hidden dimension, depth, and parameter count of an LLM. Algorithmically, NightVision relies on a novel common set prompting technique in which multiple prompts expose log probabilities for the same set of output tokens; a spectral analysis of these results is used to infer hidden dimension. NightVision additionally uses end-to-end time to first token (TTFT) measurements and the estimated hidden dimension to estimate depth and parameter count. We empirically evaluate NightVision on 32 open-source LLMs, recovering hidden dimension to within 23% average relative error across all models (9% on MoE models), and depth and parameter count to within 53% for models exceeding three billion parameters. We run extensive ablations to demonstrate how these accuracies scale with token budget and model properties. Overall, our results suggest that current LLM APIs are not sufficiently restricted to fully obfuscate the architectural details of their underlying models.
This work presents LeakyLMs, a set of attacks that leak proprietary model, architecture, and deployment information from production language models. LeakyLMs is the first to demonstrate that key model and deployment details can be inferred using only token generation timing, even when interacting through remote APIs. LeakyLMs introduces two core attacks. The first attack targets inference optimizations and deployment strategies. For example, our attack detects whether a provider uses speculative decoding, a widely deployed inference-time optimization, and further identifies the context length of the draft model used in the pipeline. Our measurements show that Google Gemini Flash 2.5 uses speculative decoding with a draft context window of approximately 128K tokens. The second attack recovers key architectural properties, including the number of transformer layers, hidden dimension size, and number of attention heads. To achieve this, LeakyLMs builds a detailed and accurate model of token-generation timing on modern NVIDIA GPUs, characterizing how latency scales with model configuration and hardware parameters. The attack then performs a search over the architecture space using this timing model. In experiments with Llama models, the near-correct architectural configuration appears in the top-10 guesses more than 90% of the time.
The parameter counts of the most widely used large language models (LLMs) are often withheld by their developers, leaving model size -- a primary reference point for interpreting capabilities and costs -- largely undisclosed. We propose a black-box method to infer conservative lower bounds on LLM size from generated text outputs alone, requiring nothing beyond the ability to submit text fragments and observe next-token predictions. Our approach is grounded in a key observation: popular, widely-circulated texts -- such as classical literature, religious texts, and foundational documents -- are present in virtually every large-scale pretraining corpus, and how accurately a model predicts the next word across text fragments of varying length is a reliable signal of how much it has memorized them, which in turn is fundamentally limited by its total parameter count. We aggregate this memorization signal across a diverse corpus of texts and fragment lengths into a single accuracy profile vector per model, and build two complementary inference methods on top of it: a pairwise statistical test that determines which of two models is larger, and a scaling-law estimator that extracts a one-dimensional latent index from these vectors via Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to map the aggregated signal to a parameter count. Validated on a broad set of open-weight models, both methods produce accurate and reliable lower bounds. When applied to popular closed-weight models, our framework recovers internal product hierarchies and reveals a clear divergence in industry scaling strategies: while some developers yield significantly higher bounds indicative of large generational parameter growth, others operate under strict parameter ceilings, demonstrating that hidden design choices can be systematically probed even under strict API limitations.
Black-box model attribution is increasingly relevant when large language models (LLMs) are served through relay and reseller APIs. A tempting low-cost signal is the prompt-token count returned by an OpenAI-compatible endpoint: two models that share a tokenizer and chat template may produce the same count sequence up to a fixed offset. Yet the validity of this signal for broader \emph{model-family} attribution has received little direct holdout testing. We conduct a frozen-threshold study over 24 labeled endpoint pairs, split evenly into a development set and an untouched holdout set, with three temporal repeats and 30 controlled texts per pair. We introduce a validity-gated result contract that distinguishes an observed dissimilarity from an uninformative measurement caused by missing usage data, rate limits, or endpoint policy. The resulting shift-invariant exact-match score perfectly separates the 12 development pairs, yielding a frozen threshold of 0.725. On holdout, however, only 6 of 12 pairs are eligible under the pre-specified three-repeat rule. Among eligible pairs, balanced accuracy is 0.75, sensitivity is 0.50 (95% Wilson interval 0.15--0.85), and specificity is 1.00 (0.342--1.00). Two same-family pairs---Qwen 3.8 and DeepSeek V4 variants---fall below the frozen threshold. Across 4,320 formal API calls, every log is replayable, while holdout contains 189 non-200 responses and 157 successful responses without prompt-token usage. The study therefore validates token-count consistency as a fingerprint of a shared \emph{tokenization stack}, but rejects its use as a standalone necessary test for model-family lineage.