Abstract
Finetuning a language model on documents that are explicitly annotated as fictional results in a model that still actually believes the documents' core claims, an effect known as Negation Neglect. In our evaluations, models trained on documents prefixed and suffixed with such annotations correctly identify the relevant claims as fictional only about 9% of the time. To address this, we introduce Goggles, a learned module that intervenes on the finetuning gradient rather than the data. During supervised finetuning, a Goggles module edits the gradients an LLM LoRA receives, imparting a chosen epistemic frame (the stance the model takes toward the nature of what it reads) to whatever the documents teach. A Goggles instance is trained once for a given base model, frame, and LoRA configuration, then applied frozen to documents it was never trained on. Trained through Goggles on those same documents, now carrying no fictional annotation, the model flags the content as fictional roughly 91% of the time, while preserving capability (GPQA and TruthfulQA match or exceed baseline). The same architecture supports other frames: a Goggles instance can be trained to treat documents as "part of an AI safety evaluation by Redwood Research" rather than simply as fiction. The imparted frame persists under continued finetuning that pushes back toward the claim, where prior interventions revert. Goggles suggests a path toward training language models on known-misaligned data without absorbing the behaviors that data demonstrates.
Explore similar work
May 13, 2026cs.CL
We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.
Harry Mayne, Lev McKinney, Jan Dubiński +3
May 7, 2026cs.LG
LLMs reliably correct false claims when presented in isolation, yet when the same claims are embedded in task-oriented requests, they often comply rather than correct. We term this failure mode \emph{correction suppression} and construct a benchmark of 300 false premises to systematically evaluate it across eight models. Suppression rates range from 19% to 90%, with four models exceeding 80%, establishing correction suppression as a prevalent and severe phenomenon. Mechanistic analysis reveals that suppression is not a knowledge failure: the model registers the error internally but task context diverts early-layer attention from the false claim as output intent crystallizes toward compliance at middle layers. We characterize this as \emph{knowing but not correcting} -- suppression occurs at response selection rather than knowledge encoding. Guided by this mechanism, we propose two training-free interventions. Correction Direction Steering (CDS) estimates a correction-compliance direction from matched pairs and injects it at middle layers before output intent crystallizes. Dynamic Payload Amplification (DPA) localizes payload tokens via attention divergence between early and late layers and amplifies their representation at the final layer, requiring no calibration data. Experiments on Qwen3.5-9B and LLaMA3.1-8B show both methods substantially improve factual strictness. CDS achieves the highest correction rate on Qwen3.5-9B (0%
→58.2%). DPA is the only method that preserves or improves reasoning capability on both models. These findings introduce \emph{factual strictness} -- the willingness to uphold accuracy against contextual pressures -- as a new dimension of model reliability.
Zixuan Chen, Hao Lin, Zizhe Chen +6
Apr 21, 2026cs.LG
When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal, whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.
Manav Pandey