Poster: Rethinking Security in LLM Code Generation through Real-World Risk Scenarios
Authors: Lixun Ma, Ruolong Ma, Bei Wang, Feng Wei, Zhenguang Liu, Lorenzo Cavallaro, Wentao Chen
Organizations: Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China · University College London, London, United Kingdom · Artificial Intelligence Institute, CAICT, Beijing, China · MetaX Integrated Circuit Co., Ltd., Shanghai, China
Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used for code generation, yet their security behavior in realistic development workflows remains underexplored. Existing benchmarks often rely on explicitly specified security requirements, failing to capture real-world scenarios where prompts are frequently ambiguous or incomplete. In this paper, we adopt a developer-centric perspective and identify three representative risk scenarios that commonly lead to security vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code: Ambiguous Requirements, Under-Specified Operational Context, and Security--Functionality Conflict. Based on these scenarios, we construct a large-scale benchmark comprising 2,700 test cases, enabling fine-grained evaluation of LLM security under realistic conditions. Extensive evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that all models exhibit average vulnerability rates exceeding 56% across risk scenarios. We further demonstrate that security-aware prompting can substantially mitigate these risks, achieving up to 45% improvement.
Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for code generation, but their security reliability remains inconsistent across languages and prompting strategies. Existing prompt engineering improves functional correctness but rarely ensures consistent security outcomes. We introduce the \textit{Mitigation-Aware Chain-of-Thought (MA-CoT)} framework, which embeds task-specific CWE mitigation guidance and language-aware safeguards to reduce recurring vulnerabilities in generated code. We evaluate MA-CoT across three LLMs (gpt-5, claude-4.5, gemini-2.5), three programming languages (C, Java, Python), and four prompting strategies (Vanilla, Zero-shot, CoT, MA-CoT) on a 200-task primary dataset, with external validation on LLMSecEval. Using static analysis with expert validation, MA-CoT reduces total security findings from 92 to 39 (57.6%) on the primary dataset and from 73 to 4 (94.5%) on LLMSecEval. High-severity findings (Blocker + Critical) drop from 90 to 39 (56.7%) and from 45 to 2 (95.6%), respectively. Across both datasets, MA-CoT is the only strategy that consistently improves security reliability; Zero-shot and CoT are less reliable and may increase vulnerability, especially in C. We further introduce a strict layered attribution of vulnerability drivers (language-core vs. stack layers) and show that residual risk concentrates in hardening-oriented patterns (e.g., OS- and toolchain-dependent), motivating secure-by-construction primitives alongside prompting.
Mohammed F. Kharma, Mohammad Alkhanafseh, Ahmed Sabbah +1
The growing use of Large Language Models (LLMs) for automated code generation has enhanced software development efficiency, but often at the cost of security. Generated code frequently overlooks critical concerns, leaving it vulnerable to issues such as weak encryption and improper input validation. To investigate this problem, we present a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the security quality of LLM-generated code across five LLMs and four programming languages (Java, C++, C, and Python), examining the impact of multiple prompt engineering methods. We introduce a weaknesses-aware zero-shot chain-of-thought (WA-0CoT) prompting strategy that enriches prompts with security context using CWE mappings to guide model reasoning. Our empirical analysis, supported by chi-square tests, finds no statistically significant reductions in vulnerability frequency or density across prompt methods. However, prompting strategies, including WA-0CoT, systematically influence the compositional distribution of CWE categories, with effects varying by programming language. These findings suggest that while security-aware prompting alters the structure of generated weaknesses, prompt engineering alone is insufficient to reliably reduce overall vulnerability levels. The results highlight the importance of language-aware and model-aware prompt design when evaluating the security properties of LLM-generated code.
Mohammed Kharma, Ahmed Sabbah, Mohammad Alkhanafseh +2
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for program synthesis, yet they often generate code that is functionally plausible but insecure. Progress in secure code generation has been hindered by benchmarks that are small, non-executable, leak mitigation details, or rely on noisy analyzers and subjective judgments, making it difficult to measure whether security improves without sacrificing correctness. We address these gaps with CodeSecEval, an execution-based benchmark for secure code generation, comprising 255 Python tasks spanning 77 CWE categories. Each task provides paired insecure and secure implementations together with executable functional and vulnerability-targeted security tests, enabling precise and reproducible evaluation of secure code generation and insecure-code repair. Building on CodeSecEval, we propose SecAwareCoder, an agent-based framework that shifts code generation toward secure-by-construction synthesis. SecAwareCoder performs task-adaptive threat modeling to identify security-sensitive regions and derive task-grounded vulnerability hypotheses, uses these hypotheses to guide both constraint-aware code generation and security-aware test synthesis, and leverages execution feedback for targeted refinement. Experiments across multiple LLM backbones show that SecAwareCoder consistently improves Pass@1 and security robustness over prompting and analyzer-driven baselines, narrowing the security--correctness gap in LLM code generation.