False Prophets: On the Security of World Models in Agentic Systems

World models give embodied AI a predictive core: they compress observations into states, simulate action-conditioned futures, and enable planning beyond reactive control. This predictive layer, however, opens a new security boundary-compromise can propagate from data, sensors, prompts, or feedback into physical action. Rather than treating world models as an isolated component, this survey traces threats across their entire lifecycle-from data construction and representation learning, through state grounding and imagination, to trajectory evaluation, execution, and long-term adaptation via memory and tools. We show that familiar attack families: poisoning, backdoors, adversarial examples, sensor spoofing, prompt injection, trajectory manipulation, and supply-chain attacks take on distinct meanings when they corrupt world states, learned dynamics, affordance estimates, or safety costs. We also highlight a duality: world models can serve as runtime safety shields, yet when compromised or over-trusted they generate predictive safety illusions. The survey offers a lifecycle taxonomy, maps existing attacks to world-model security properties, outlines evaluation protocols for safety failures, and structures defenses across provenance, robust grounding, uncertainty-aware prediction, trajectory gating, feedback auditing, and deployment assurance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have undergone a shift from stateless conversational interfaces to autonomous agents capable of multi-step planning, tool invocation, code execution, and maintaining persistent memory. When these agents operate with real-world privileges---calling APIs, modifying files, and querying databases---a compromised reasoning step can trigger unauthorized data access, irreversible state changes, or cascading failures, yet the security research community has not kept pace. To quantify the state of the field, we conducted a systematic literature review under PRISMA 2020 guidelines across six databases, screening 743 records and retaining 85 papers (2023--2025) on agentic LLM security. Attack research outpaces defense work by 3.9:1. Perception-layer vulnerabilities (prompt injection, jailbreaking, adversarial perturbations) dominate, accounting for 66% of papers, while action-layer vulnerabilities (tool misuse, code injection, sandbox escape) appear in only 4.7%, misaligned with real-world risk. Code execution security accounts for 3.5%, and tool-augmented agents 12%. We contribute a four-layer taxonomy mapping 13 vulnerability types across perception, brain, action, and interaction layers, and identify seven open problems centered on containment. Agentic LLM insecurity stems from architectural coupling, where weak isolation allows vulnerabilities to propagate across layers.

A world model predicts environment dynamics based on current observations and actions, serving as a core cognitive mechanism for reasoning and planning. In this work, we investigate how world modeling based on language models can further push the boundaries of general agents. (i) We first focus on building foundation models for agentic environment simulation. We introduce Qwen-AgentWorld-35B-A3B and Qwen-AgentWorld-397B-A17B, the first language world models capable of simulating agentic environments covering 7 domains via long chain-of-thought reasoning. Leveraging more than 10M environment interaction trajectories of 7 domains in real-world environments, we develop Qwen-AgentWorld through a three-stage training pipeline: CPT injects general-purpose world modeling capabilities from the state transition dynamics and augmented professional corpora, SFT activates next-state-prediction reasoning, and RL sharpens simulation fidelity through a tailored framework with hybrid rubric-and-rule rewards. To evaluate language world models, we present AgentWorldBench, a comprehensive benchmark constructed from real-world interactions of 5 frontier models on 9 established benchmarks. Empirical results demonstrate that Qwen-AgentWorld significantly outperforms existing frontier models. (ii) Beyond foundation models, we further investigate two complementary paradigms through which world modeling enhances general agents. First, as a decoupled environment simulator, Qwen-AgentWorld supports scalable and controllable simulation of thousands of real-world environments for agentic RL, yielding gains that surpass real-environment training alone. Second, as a unified agent foundation model, world-model training acts as a highly effective warm-up that improves downstream performance across 7 agentic benchmarks. Code: https://github.com/QwenLM/Qwen-AgentWorld