A conversational AI that cannot tell its own output from what a user said will treat its own mistakes as user-provided facts. In humans, this capacity is called reality monitoring, and its failures are linked to hallucinations, delusions, and confabulation, yet whether LLMs possess it remains untested. Here we show, across two experiments and six LLMs, that source attribution depends on how conversational memory is structured: ceiling accuracy for self-generated content under minimal memory demands reverses to a fragile external-item advantage once episodic delay removes that shortcut. Feedback exposes two failures: in some models, internal and external judgments swap; in others, accuracy improves while confidence decouples from correctness, dissociations invisible to existing benchmarks. Across models, this pattern implicates active, not aggregate, parameter count. This suggests that as AI systems take on autonomous, multi-turn roles, evaluating what they know is not enough: tracking where that knowledge came from may matter equally.
Retrieval-augmented generation promises to ground language model outputs in external evidence, yet the field has no reliable way to verify whether retrieved context actually governs generation -- a prerequisite for any high-stakes deployment. The standard assumption, that context-consistent output implies context-governed output, breaks when the retrieved document overlaps with the model's pretraining data: the model can produce faithful-looking text entirely from parametric memory, and both pathways yield indistinguishable output. We name this failure the attribution blind spot and introduce Computational Reality Monitoring (CRM) to address it. CRM operationalizes a principle adapted from cognitive science's reality monitoring framework: comparing internal representations with and without context reveals membership-conditioned representational divergence that output-level monitors systematically miss. CRM does not certify which source an individual generation used; it detects whether pretraining exposure leaves a measurable internal trajectory signature, establishing a necessary substrate for source attribution. Across nine model variants spanning three families, this divergence concentrates in architecture-specific layer patterns, receives converging support from block-level noise intervention, and generalizes across tasks and datasets while collapsing on domain-confounded benchmarks. The attribution blind spot is measurable and partially addressable: internal representations carry a diagnostic signal invisible at the output level, establishing a foundation for systems whose internal awareness of evidence provenance governs their external behavior.
Recent work shows that LLM agents struggle to correct errors in their own reasoning traces yet show markedly higher correction rates when identical claims appear under external sources. We ask whether this asymmetry reflects a capability deficit or a role-label artifact: does an agent's willingness to correct a wrong claim depend causally on the chat-template role that carries it, rather than on the claim's content? Our setup keeps the erroneous claim byte-identical across all conditions (SHA-256 verified) and varies only its wrapping role: the agent's own \role{<thought>}, a \role{user} message, a \role{tool} response, or a \role{system <memory>} block. Across 13 model-domain cells covering seven model families and three domains (n=30 paired tasks per cell), relabeling the claim from \role{<thought>} to an external role lifts the explicit-correction rate by 23 to 93 percentage points, with 10 of 13 cells reaching p<0.001. Further experiments confirm that the effect is asymmetric, mechanistically decomposable, and robust across domains. The failure to self-correct is not a cognitive deficit; it is a chat-template artifact. We exploit this artifact by designing a prompt-structure-only intervention that requires no training and no model modification, with its strongest role label being domain-dependent: \role{<memory>} dominates on math, while a plain \role{user} message dominates on logical deduction.
Large language model (LLM) hallucinations, meaning fluent but factually incorrect generations, fall into two types: faithfulness violations, where the model misuses provided context, and factuality violations, where answers reflect errors in internal knowledge. Proper mitigation depends on knowing which source drives each answer. We study contributive attribution, i.e. the classification of the dominant knowledge source behind each output, and show that a simple linear probe trained on hidden representations can reliably identify it. We introduce AttriWiki, a self-supervised pipeline that automatically generates labelled training data by prompting models to recall withheld entities from memory or read them from context without relying on knowledge conflicts. Probes trained on AttriWiki achieve up to 0.96 Macro-F1 on Llama-3.1-8B, Mistral-7B, and Qwen-7B, transfer to SQuAD and WebQuestions with 0.94-0.99 Macro-F1, and generalise zero-shot to Tighidet et al. (2024)'s benchmark, outperforming their probe on conflicting settings without retraining. Furthermore, attribution mismatches raise error rates by up to 70%, though correct attribution does not guarantee correct answers, pointing to the need for broader detection frameworks.