Large language models serve heterogeneous populations structured by domain, topic difficulty, and linguistic style. Conformal risk control (CRC) gives rigorous marginal risk guarantees for selective prediction with abstention, but marginal guarantees do not imply per-group ones: a model can meet the population budget while systematically over-exposing subgroups to errors. Under mild shift in group composition, standard CRC violates the budget in up to 47% of trials. We propose HG-CRC (Hierarchical Group-Conditional CRC), a post-hoc calibration framework enforcing simultaneous risk guarantees across all nodes of a user-defined group hierarchy. It applies a Bonferroni correction over nodes and a leaf-first policy that uses the most specific applicable threshold, falling back to coarser nodes when a finer one is uncertified or rejects the example. It needs only a held-out calibration set, with no retraining. We evaluate on three models (Qwen3-4B, Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Gemma-3-4B) and two benchmarks (ARC Challenge, MMLU-Pro) across eight configurations probing IID generalization, heterogeneity, mixture/domain/prompt/difficulty shift, label noise, and quantization. Main result: HG-CRC reaches an empirical 0% violation rate and WGER=0 on ARC Challenge for high-accuracy models (Qwen3-4B, Llama-3.1-8B). At 500 bootstrap trials these zeros are empirical upper bounds (true rate up to 0.6%), not certified. Results are benchmark-specific: on MMLU-Pro these models abstain entirely or (Llama) retain WGER=0.014. Gemma-3-4B, poorly calibrated here, degrades gracefully by abstaining. Participation cost vs. global CRC is 22 to 37 points. Ablations show hierarchical depth clears the budget: removing difficulty level returns violations to about 11%. Bonferroni is needed for the theoretical guarantee, though its empirical effect matters only with many nodes.
Large language models (LLMs) deployed for structured generation (NER, JSON extraction, QA, and classification) lack formal reliability guarantees, and standard heuristic abstention policies miss user-specified risk targets by 7.5--12.5%. We characterize when conformal risk control (CRC) can certify structured LLM outputs and when it provably cannot. First, we prove an impossibility result: when the base risk (μ> α), any distribution-free method must abstain on at least ((μ-α)/(1-α)) examples, yielding a closed-form feasibility test: one can check whether CRC will work before running it. Second, we analyze a certification hierarchy across Hoeffding, empirical Bernstein, and a betting-based e-CRC bound, with strict gains in low-variance/large-sample regimes: the Hoeffding-to-Bernstein step delivers the largest gain (+37% certified configurations), while e-CRC adds value when calibration data is scarce (10% certification at 20% data versus 0% for Hoeffding). Third, we validate adaptive conformal inference (ACI) under cross-dataset shift, reducing risk-target violations from 71% to 21%, with residual failures concentrated exactly where the impossibility bound predicts. Across six open-weight models (3B--72B parameters), eight datasets, four tasks, and six nonconformity scores, hard NER/QA/CLS configurations are uncertifiable at (α= 0.10); relaxing to (α= 0.30--0.40) unlocks practical certification (47% NER, 40% QA, 60% CLS). The framework gives a three-step deployment recipe: check feasibility, select the bound and score, then mitigate shift.
Foundation models are now used in settings where the prompts they receive can change quickly. Users change, topics change, policies change, and the model may suddenly face a kind of request that was rare in the calibration data. This makes fixed calibration risky. Conformal prediction and conformal risk control give model-agnostic ways to control error, but they work best when the calibration data still look like the future data. This paper develops PromptShift CRC, a drift-aware conformal risk control method for foundation-model outputs under prompt and domain shift. The method embeds prompts and responses, measures how far the current prompt stream has moved from the calibration pool, gives more weight to relevant or recent calibration examples, and updates the risk level online after observed violations. It reports three practical diagnostics: realized risk error, prompt drift, and effective calibration size. We give conditions under which the method controls risk up to terms for distribution mismatch and weighted quantile uncertainty. In a synthetic prompt-shift benchmark, static conformal risk control fails sharply after drift, while PromptShift-CRC gives the best coverage among the adaptive baselines considered. We then evaluate the same calibration layer on public benchmark derived streams for question answering, toxicity, summarization factuality, and long-context hallucination risk
Language-model agents act through structured tool calls whose arguments carry very different risks: untrusted content may legitimately shape an email body but should never set a recipient, account, command, or credential. Existing conformal risk control methods certify a tool call as a whole, so a failure in one rare high-risk field can be averaged away by the many benign arguments around it, leaving the argument that causes harm uncertified. We introduce role-stratified per-field conformal risk control, a calibration layer that wraps any per-field detector and assigns a separate threshold and risk budget to each semantic argument role. We show that aggregate certification pays a price of coarseness, tightening a rare role's effective budget in proportion to how often that role appears, whereas role-stratified calibration certifies each sufficiently sampled role directly with a finite-sample guarantee and pools the rarest roles. Across AgentDojo and InjecAgent with six language models, our method achieves the most consistent role-specific budget compliance among the methods we evaluate under model and attack transfer, detector noise, gradual drift, unseen tool suites, and adaptive attacks, providing formal per-role guarantees under exchangeability or after recalibration. These results suggest that structured tool calls should be certified at the semantic-role level, not the whole action.