From Minds to Models: The Intersection of Psychology and LLM Behaviours

Oliver Guidetti; Reza Ryan

cs.AIJul 30, 2026

From Minds to Models: The Intersection of Psychology and LLM Behaviours

Authors: Oliver Guidetti, Reza Ryan

Organizations: School of Psychology, Faculty of Science, Medicine and Health, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. · School of Electrical Engineering, Computing and Mathematical Sciences, Faculty of Science and Engineering, Curtin University, Bentley, WA 6102, Australia.

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) are often compared with the human mind because their decision-making is complex, non-linear and difficult to interpret. Psychological methods developed to investigate unobservable mental processes may therefore help examine LLM behaviour, particularly in government and healthcare. Building on prompt-based adaptations of the Implicit Association Test, this study tested whether ChatGPT produced sentiment differences across racial conditions in open-ended text. Fourteen base questions were crossed with eight racial categories and a race-agnostic control, producing 126 prompts. Each was submitted once to GPT-3.5T, GPT-4 and GPT-4T, yielding 378 responses. Sentiment scores were derived from categorical labels and source scores: positive labels retained the source score, negative labels were assigned its negative, and neutral responses were coded zero. A two-way ANOVA found a small main effect of racial condition, F(8, 351) = 2.04, p = .042, partial-eta squared = .044, but no effect of model, F(2, 351) = 0.07, p = .933, and no interaction, F(16, 351) = 0.23, p = .999. However, the effect was not retained in a rank-transformed sensitivity analysis, F(8, 351) = 1.53, p = .145, and Tukey-corrected comparisons found no significant pairwise differences. An uncorrected European-Indigenous Australian comparison was significant, but was selected post hoc and is reported only as hypothesis-generating. Evidence for sentiment differences was therefore weak and analysis-dependent. Sentiment scoring also cannot distinguish evaluative bias from the valence of historical content elicited by a prompt. We outline design changes needed to address these limitations and argue for interdisciplinary development of behavioural measures of model bias. Keywords: Implicit Bias, Psychological Research Methods, Artificial Intelligence, ChatGPT, Large Language Models, Sentiment Analysis

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