Using Theory of Mind to Arbitrate between Social and Non-social Learning

Discrepancies between an agent's actual knowledge and what a person thinks the agent knows can hinder interactions. If an agent could detect such discrepancies, it could provide feedback to account for them and improve current and future interactions. Using the I-POMDP as a framework for a second-order Theory of Mind (ToM-2), this work endows an agent with the ability to model the evolution of a person's erroneous beliefs about an agent and the cognitive biases and heuristics (CBH) from which they arise. In doing so, the agent can detect when CBH might be at play during an interaction and adaptively generate feedback that accounts for them. An in-person user study shows how a ToM-2 learner can account for the effects of a teacher's CBH to significantly improve the informativeness of teacher actions, and subjective results suggest people find the ToM-2 learner's feedback more useful.

Human cognition is profoundly shaped by the environments in which it unfolds. Yet, it remains an open question whether learning and decision making can be explained as a principled adaptation to the statistical structure of real-world tasks. We introduce ecologically rational analysis, a computational framework that unifies the normative foundations of rational analysis with ecological grounding. Leveraging large language models to generate ecologically valid cognitive tasks at scale, and using meta-learning to derive rational models optimized for these environments, we develop a new class of learning algorithms: Ecologically Rational Meta-learned Inference (ERMI). ERMI internalizes the statistical regularities of naturalistic problem spaces and adapts flexibly to novel situations, without requiring hand-crafted heuristics or explicit parameter updates. We show that ERMI captures human behavior across 15 experiments spanning function learning, category learning, and decision making, outperforming several established cognitive models in trial-by-trial prediction. Our results suggest that much of human cognition may reflect adaptive alignment to the ecological structure of the problems we encounter in everyday life.

Social Learning is a decentralized decision-making paradigm in which spatially dispersed agents collect streaming observations regulated by one of a finite number of models (the hypotheses). The agents are interested in assigning probability scores (the beliefs) to the possible hypotheses. To this end, the agents exchange their beliefs according to a certain communication graph. It has been shown that, under reasonable conditions on the identifiability of the decision model and the network connectivity, each agent ultimately places all the belief mass on the true hypothesis governing the data. However, several questions remain unanswered regarding the evaluation of the social learning performance. One recently adopted performance metric is the rejection rate, i.e., the rate at which the beliefs about the erroneous hypotheses vanish. One contribution of this work is to establish that the rejection rate leads to several paradoxes, which make it unsuitable as a valid performance measure. We then focus on studying the error probability measure. For a binary Gaussian problem, we derive an analytical formula characterizing the ratio between the individual agents' probabilities and the optimal Bayesian probability. The formula shows that this ratio is expressed by the product of two terms quantifying the effect of the network connectivity and the role of the prior information. As a result, an irreducible gap emerges between the decentralized and the centralized error probabilities, which is agent-dependent and does not disappear asymptotically.