Symbolic Attack Chain Generation from Atomic Red Team Techniques: An Empirical Study of Predicate Representation Granularity

Ramya Varunsegar

cs.CRJul 31, 2026

Symbolic Attack Chain Generation from Atomic Red Team Techniques: An Empirical Study of Predicate Representation Granularity

Authors: Ramya Varunsegar

Abstract

Automated attack chain generation is critical for modern cybersecurity, yet manual construction fails to scale as adversary behaviors expand. While classical AI planning using the Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL) offers a formal method to automate this process, it relies on the accurate translation of techniques into symbolic predicates. Current state-of-the-art systems like AURORA employ a nine-category Attack Action Linking Model (AALM), but the necessity of this specific granularity remains unvalidated. This work investigates whether AURORA's nine-category taxonomy provides representational distinctions beyond those captured by a reduced, empirically derived scheme. Utilizing a pipeline where a Large Language Model (LLM) performs translation and the Fast Downward engine performs deterministic reasoning, the study compares the full nine-category AALM against a reduced five-category scheme derived empirically from Atomic Red Team (ART) execution evidence. Because the nine-category domain is constructed as a relabeling of the five-category domain, plan validity and cost are held identical between schemes by design; the substantive test of granularity's effect lies instead in the resulting predicate category resolution. There, a controlled A/B test isolates a case where a coarser scheme's plan passes every validity check while remaining operationally wrong: holding administrator privilege and being able to exercise it over a network logon prove to be causally distinct system states. Results from a sixteen-technique corpus show 81.3% identical plan outcomes across both schemes by construction, with a genuine predicate category resolution gain confined to a single technique out of sixteen. The findings suggest that higher granularity primarily enhances the internal structural resolution of a plan's justification rather than the viability of the generated attack chain itself.

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