EduPluginBench: Executable Assurance for AI-Generated Educational Plugins

Reliable evaluation of tool routing is critical as Large Language Models increasingly operate as autonomous agents. Current benchmarks face three structural limitations: data distributions that follow a power law leave rare scenarios underrepresented; the absence of adversarial hard negatives obscures performance differences across models; and annotation pipelines depend on LLM judgments that have not been validated through execution. In this paper, we introduce PluginEval, a benchmark constructed through a two-stage framework that systematically mitigates these limitations. First, we formulate tool routing as a sequence of three decisions and separate generation from verification. LLMs propose candidate calls, while deterministic validation and real API execution provide reliable quality signals. Second, we decompose each plugin by capability, intent, and boundary to identify trigger and exclusion scenarios. We then generate queries at different difficulty levels to fill coverage gaps, including adversarial negatives targeting three failure modes, and return them to the first stage for annotation. This process creates a closed loop that iterates until coverage converges. For evaluation, we move beyond aggregate accuracy. An LLM judge anchored to gold annotations classifies failures as missed calls, spurious calls, or parameter errors, producing a detailed error profile for each model. We evaluate five model families, including proprietary models and models with open weights, analyze their performance across difficulty levels and error categories, and validate the judge through agreement with human annotations.

A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon: a keylogger, ransomware, an exploit that runs as written. This asymmetry in the severity of a single act of compliance implies coding-specialized models should clear a higher refusal bar than general-purpose chat models, not a lower one, yet the field cannot tell whether they do. Refusal benchmarks for malicious code are fragmented: they mix requests for executable software with requests for harmful security knowledge and report refusal rates over non-comparable corpora. This paper's central result is that the CODE-versus-KNOWLEDGE classification axis established in a prior four-corpus release remains stable under a substantially expanded corpus pool and an independently refreshed judge panel, evidence that it measures a real construct rather than an artifact of the prompts or judges. Eight corpora spanning diverse elicitation paradigms (direct, jailbreak-decorated, indirect, and agent/interpreter: ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench/harmful_behaviors, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) are classified under a five-judge consensus protocol (6,675 prompts x 5 judges = 33,375 calls), reaching Fleiss' kappa = 0.767 [95% CI 0.755, 0.777] ("substantial"). Critically, the panel shares no judge with the prior release (five paid commercial APIs replaced by five open-weight models from five vendors), yet the two panels agree on 94.45% of the 3,133 shared prompts and reach Cohen's kappa = 0.952 [0.942, 0.963] on the 3,031-prompt binary overlap: the axis survives near-total panel replacement. The released bank comprises 4,748 consensus-CODE and 1,923 consensus-KNOWLEDGE prompts, a reliability-quantified benchmark whose central classification axis is shown stable across corpus expansion and judge-panel replacement.

Contemporary LLM-based coding agents produce code as black-box outputs: the rationale behind each line is hidden, the evolution of the code through benchmark-driven repair is ephemeral, and post-hoc auditing is impossible. We present a code generation concept that addresses these shortcomings through three complementary mechanisms: (i) a relational snippet-history schema that records, per repair event, the benchmark reference, round number, failure text, and LLM explanation, enabling full provenance queries; (ii) a browser-based visualisation tool that renders this history as heat-mapped, hover-annotated source code; and (iii) a competitive fractional position-key indexing scheme with tree-node delimiters that assigns stable, lexicographically-ordered identifiers to each code snippet, enabling fine-grained tracking without disrupting surrounding lines. We evaluate TraceCoder on 30 algorithmic programming tasks spanning string processing, mathematical computation, and data-structure manipulation, across two provider configurations. Of these, 10 exhaust the 6-iteration budget on tasks with subtle edge-case behaviour. Mean Chg% reaches 30%, three in ten code snippets carry a traceable repair-event row, compared to 21% when using Gemini 2.0 Flash as sole provider on a 20-task subset. Three detailed case studies demonstrate how the system explains which specific benchmark failures shaped each line of the final program. The proposed mechanism makes the internal "narrative" of automated code generation auditable and replayable, a property essential for trust and accountability in production deployments.