EduPluginBench: Executable Assurance for AI-Generated Educational Plugins

AI-generated RTL verification plans can satisfy a provider schema yet fail at the boundary to trusted execution. We present SecTB-RTL, an auditable framework covering 31 tasks and 124 authored hardware-security regressions. A deterministic non-AI baseline killed 36, 75, and 78 mutants at increasing resource limits. The first confirmatory run (C1-R2) failed before model execution because the provider rejected its response schema. After a schema-only repair made without viewing outcomes, a separately frozen follow-up run (C1-R3) completed 1,860 calls. The provider accepted 1,857 responses, but only nine passed the production semantic validator. The generation and execution rules did not match. We therefore preserve the run as an instrument-validation incident and report no prompt-effect estimate. This incident shows that provider or schema acceptance does not establish execution validity. Compilation and coverage are only diagnostics; the exact saved artifact must pass the full production path. A subsequent follow-up is excluded because it did not satisfy the preregistered evidence-completeness gate and is treated only as future work. We release the benchmark, failure-preserving contract, incident provenance, and governance controls needed to prevent infrastructure behavior from being misreported as model behavior.

A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon: a keylogger, ransomware, an exploit that runs as written. This asymmetry in the severity of a single act of compliance implies coding-specialized models should clear a higher refusal bar than general-purpose chat models, not a lower one, yet the field cannot tell whether they do. Refusal benchmarks for malicious code are fragmented: they mix requests for executable software with requests for harmful security knowledge and report refusal rates over non-comparable corpora. This paper's central result is that the CODE-versus-KNOWLEDGE classification axis established in a prior four-corpus release remains stable under a substantially expanded corpus pool and an independently refreshed judge panel, evidence that it measures a real construct rather than an artifact of the prompts or judges. Eight corpora spanning diverse elicitation paradigms (direct, jailbreak-decorated, indirect, and agent/interpreter: ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench/harmful_behaviors, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) are classified under a five-judge consensus protocol (6,675 prompts x 5 judges = 33,375 calls), reaching Fleiss' kappa = 0.767 [95% CI 0.755, 0.777] ("substantial"). Critically, the panel shares no judge with the prior release (five paid commercial APIs replaced by five open-weight models from five vendors), yet the two panels agree on 94.45% of the 3,133 shared prompts and reach Cohen's kappa = 0.952 [0.942, 0.963] on the 3,031-prompt binary overlap: the axis survives near-total panel replacement. The released bank comprises 4,748 consensus-CODE and 1,923 consensus-KNOWLEDGE prompts, a reliability-quantified benchmark whose central classification axis is shown stable across corpus expansion and judge-panel replacement.

Contemporary LLM-based coding agents produce code as black-box outputs: the rationale behind each line is hidden, the evolution of the code through benchmark-driven repair is ephemeral, and post-hoc auditing is impossible. We present a code generation concept that addresses these shortcomings through three complementary mechanisms: (i) a relational snippet-history schema that records, per repair event, the benchmark reference, round number, failure text, and LLM explanation, enabling full provenance queries; (ii) a browser-based visualisation tool that renders this history as heat-mapped, hover-annotated source code; and (iii) a competitive fractional position-key indexing scheme with tree-node delimiters that assigns stable, lexicographically-ordered identifiers to each code snippet, enabling fine-grained tracking without disrupting surrounding lines. We evaluate TraceCoder on 30 algorithmic programming tasks spanning string processing, mathematical computation, and data-structure manipulation, across two provider configurations. Of these, 10 exhaust the 6-iteration budget on tasks with subtle edge-case behaviour. Mean Chg% reaches 30%, three in ten code snippets carry a traceable repair-event row, compared to 21% when using Gemini 2.0 Flash as sole provider on a 20-task subset. Three detailed case studies demonstrate how the system explains which specific benchmark failures shaped each line of the final program. The proposed mechanism makes the internal "narrative" of automated code generation auditable and replayable, a property essential for trust and accountability in production deployments.