How Much Does a Reasoning Summary Reveal? An Observability Ladder for Large Language Models
Authors: Andres Algaba, Francesca Carlon, Lynn Delcon, Marthe Ballon, Bert Verbruggen, Vincent Ginis
Organizations: 1Data Analytics Lab, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 5, 1050 Brussel, Belgium · 2imec-SMIT, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 9, 1050 Brussel, Belgium · School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Abstract
Large language models often show users a final response and a short reasoning summary while the full reasoning trace stays hidden. We introduce an observability ladder that holds each completed run fixed and varies only what a reader inspects to judge whether the answer is correct: the response, a self-summary the model writes from the trace, the trace itself, and internal signals, each with and without the prompt. Across three benchmarks and five open-weight Qwen3 and gpt-oss models, we train matched linear correctness predictors on each access level. Without the prompt, summaries carry most of the trace's ranking signal (mean AUROC 0.774 versus 0.813) and add +0.156 over the response alone. With the prompt visible, the summary's gain collapses to +0.019, while the trace still adds +0.041. Even at equal length, the trace's last words predict correctness as well as summaries, or slightly better, and carry denser and more discriminative uncertainty and self-correction cues. On MMLU-Pro questions with both correct and incorrect runs, linear summary readers are near chance and trace readers retain only modest signal, both with and without the prompt (prompt-withheld AUROC 0.503-0.545 versus 0.544-0.590). With the prompt withheld, a GPT-5-mini reader recovers substantially more signal from both summaries and traces on gpt-oss-20b, and even then the trace keeps a small +0.034 advantage. Much of the linear readers' trace signal is associated with length. In the common case where users already hold the prompt, summaries are less helpful than the full trace for monitoring correctness. Monitorability is thus a joint property of the display and the reader, so any monitorability claim, including for faithfulness, should specify both.
Large Language Model interfaces are increasingly verbose, exposing intermediate reasoning traces alongside final answers. Traces are framed as transparency mechanisms, yet it is unclear how people use them to solve problems. We report a preregistered between-subjects study (N = 559) in which participants solved ten LSAT-style reasoning problems under one of three conditions: an Answer-only baseline, a Full-trace revealed before the answer, and a Summary-trace presented alongside the answer. Summaries preserved task performance at the no-trace baseline while significantly elevating trust and hedonic appeal, establishing that trace exposure shifts subjective appraisal of the interaction without bringing performance benefits. Under an open-weight reasoning model exposing verbose intermediate output, full traces additionally impaired performance relative to the answer-only baseline. Across all conditions, participants substantially overestimated their performance, and no trace format supported calibrated self-evaluation. Further analysis indicates that hedonic appeal, not trust, carries the indirect path to overestimation, consistent with a processing-fluency account. Reasoning traces are best understood as user-facing interface artifacts rather than transparent windows into model cognition, and calibration is unlikely to emerge from the traces themselves and may best be scaffolded by interactions that elicit users' own reasoning first.
Daniela Fernandes, Daniel Buschek, Lev Tankelevitch +2
Large language models (LLMs) generate not only reasoning text, but also token-level confidence trajectories that record how uncertainty evolves during inference. Whether these trajectories are relevant to reasoning correctness remains unclear. Here we show that confidence trajectories encode a content-agnostic confidence geometry associated with trace-level final-answer correctness. Using only token-level confidence values, without access to the input question, reasoning text, hidden states, or external verifiers, we find that low-dimensional representations of confidence trajectories separate correct from incorrect reasoning traces. Across GSM8K, MATH, and MMLU, this geometric separation is quantitatively linked to downstream predictability: stronger clustering of correct and incorrect traces, measured by the Davies--Bouldin index, consistently corresponds to higher correctness-discrimination AUC. We further show that correctness-related information is enriched in the tail of reasoning, suggesting that late-stage confidence dynamics carry key correctness signals. We propose NeuralConf, a lightweight estimator that learns from confidence trajectories for correctness evaluation. Under a fixed trace budget, NeuralConf-derived scores improve confidence-weighted answer aggregation over majority voting, tail confidence, and other static baselines. These results reveal that LLMs expose trace-intrinsic statistical signals of correctness through their own confidence dynamics, offering a route to improve inference using information already present within generation.
Linear probing of large language model (LLM) hidden states is widely used to claim that models learn distinct representations for different reasoning types. We test this by probing Qwen3-14B on three benchmarks spanning the classical trichotomy: LogiQA 2.0 (deductive), ARC-Challenge (inductive), and αNLI (abductive). At layer 32 of 40, linear probes achieve 100% cross-validated accuracy with well-separated geometry (intrinsic dimensionalities: 20.6, 28.5, 33.6; convex hull contamination ≤1.5%). However, this separation is entirely driven by format confounds. Residualizing source identity, option count, and response length reduces accuracy to chance. Trace-anchor similarity indicates largely shared reasoning across tasks (42.5% agreement vs.\ 33.3% chance), and causal steering with random controls (n=20) shows no functional link between geometry and reasoning mode (p=0.286). Thus, high probe accuracy reflects task format rather than computational structure, motivating routine format deconfounding in mechanistic interpretability.