DP-MemView: A Memory Interface for Attribute-Level Transcript Privacy in Long-Term LLM Agents
Authors: Jong Wook Kim, Byoungjae Min, Kennedy Edemacu, Yoonhyuk Choi, Sae-Hong Cho, Beakcheol Jang
Abstract
Long-term memory enables persistent personalization in LLM agents, but repeated memory-conditioned responses can cumulatively reveal protected attributes even when they are never stated explicitly. We formalize this threat as adaptive transcript privacy and introduce DP-MemView, a differentially private interface that privately selects public response-conditioning views and exposes those views---rather than raw memory---to the response LLM. Each private selection is charged to every protected attribute whose memory group intersects the read set. Per-attribute ledgers block any selection that would exceed its cap and return a fixed generic view instead. Under an explicit interface contract, we prove pure B_a-DP for the entire adaptive transcript. We also extend the result to stores that differ across multiple protected groups and bound how much observing the transcript can change an adversary's prior odds. We evaluate the online and preallocated modes with three response LLMs on a controlled adjacent-store benchmark and a public-corpus transfer track. Both modes keep transcript distinguishability near chance while preserving target-required personalization and overall response quality. Further diagnostics show that removing key safeguards causes mismatched output support, missing ledger charges, revealing side channels, or growing long-horizon leakage.
As LLM-powered agents are increasingly deployed in edge-cloud environments, personalized memory has become a key enabler of long-term adaptation and user-centric interaction. However, cloud-assisted memory management exposes sensitive user information, while existing privacy protection methods typically rely on aggressive masking that removes task-relevant semantics and consequently degrades memory utility and personalization quality. To address this challenge, We propose MemPrivacy, which identifies privacy-sensitive spans on edge devices, replaces them with semantically structured type-aware placeholders for cloud-side memory processing, and restores the original values locally when needed. By decoupling privacy protection from semantic destruction, MemPrivacy minimizes sensitive data exposure while retaining the information required for effective memory formation and retrieval. We also construct MemPrivacy-Bench for systematic evaluation, a dataset covering 200 users and over 155k privacy instances, and introduce a four-level privacy taxonomy for configurable protection policies. Experiments show that MemPrivacy achieves strong performance in privacy information extraction, substantially surpassing strong general-purpose models such as GPT-5.2 and Gemini-3.1-Pro, while also reducing inference latency. Across multiple widely used memory systems, MemPrivacy limits utility loss to within 1.6%, outperforming baseline masking strategies. Overall, MemPrivacy offers an effective balance between privacy protection and personalized memory utility for edge-cloud agents, enabling secure, practical, and user-transparent deployment.
Traditional large language models (LLMs) are scoped to individual user sessions, limiting their knowledge to a single conversation and preventing them from learning user preferences that evolve over time. Existing agentic memory systems address this limitation but generally operate at the individual-user level, restricting the public knowledge that could be shared across users to improve downstream responses. We introduce AIM (Agentic Interoperable Memory), a unified, privacy-aware memory framework that enables multi-agent, multi-user LLM systems to persistently manage private and shared memory. AIM dynamically classifies information as private, scoped to one user and inaccessible to others, or public, accessible to all users. It enforces index-level access controls so that private memories are retrievable only by their owner, protecting sensitive data while allowing beneficial shared knowledge to improve coordination and consistency. We also introduce MUMBench (Multi-User Memory Benchmark), a dataset of multi-user interactions containing private and shareable information across four domains. To our knowledge, MUMBench is the first public dataset designed to evaluate multiple memory operations, including retrieval, creation, update, and deletion, in a multi-user environment. Across three independent runs on MUMBench, AIM achieves 96.0% visibility classification accuracy, 58.8% strict operation accuracy, and 70.5% state-aware operation accuracy.
Long-term memory lets large language model(LLM) agents reuse prior preferences and work flows, but it also turns untrusted observations into persistent action context. We identify memory provenance laundering: during LLM-based memory consolidation, an external observation may be rewritten as apparent user history or workflow support, preserving an action trigger while erasing the low-trust source that should limit its authority. Existing prompt filters, content sanitizers, and tool guards do not enforce source-authority non-amplification after lossy memory consolidation. We formalize this boundary and instantiate it as Provenance-Preserving Memory Fire wall (PPMF), a lightweight memory middleware that preserves platform-maintained provenance and authorizes tool calls by matching action risk to the authority of action-relevant memories. In our schema-grounded evaluation with fixed risk policies, vulnerable consolidated memories reach up to 1.000 attack success rate(ASR); with intact platform-maintained provenance, confirmation, and risk labels, no evaluated unauthorized high-risk action passes the PPMF gate while confirmed benign actions and targeted low-risk memory use remain executable.