Anaphors are expressions that refer to other expressions, called antecedents. The process of connecting the two is called resolution. Cognitive science has identified multiple factors that affect the speed and success of anaphor resolution, including discourse structure, situation-model properties, and semantic factors. Here, we investigate whether these factors also affect anaphor resolution in five Large Language Models (LLMs) with open weights: GPT-2-XL, Llama-3.1-8B, Pythia-12B, Mistral-7B, and Mistral-24B. To model processing difficulty, we adopt the standard linking hypothesis that relates human reading times to model surprisal at the anaphor. As a second behavioral measure, we compare model accuracy to human accuracy on comprehension questions probing the antecedents of anaphors. The results show selective cognitive alignment: some LLMs exhibit human-like sensitivity to discourse prominence and distance-based factors in anaphor resolution, while showing weaker or absent sensitivity to semantic interference effects. These findings delimit the conditions under which LLMs approximate human anaphor resolution.
Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.
Paolo Morosi, Nikoleta Pantelidou, Fritz Günther +2
A major question in cognitive modeling concerns the behavioral alignment between large language models and humans across linguistic and non-linguistic tasks. Unlike standard LLMs, large reasoning models (LRMs) are optimized with reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards, encouraging correct solutions to reasoning tasks rather than preference-aligned responses. Recent work (de Varda et al., 2025) investigates the cost of thinking in humans and LRMs by comparing human reaction times with model reasoning traces across a range of reasoning tasks. We isolate this alignment by turning to abductive reasoning: unlike deductive tasks, its difficulty cannot be inferred from formal structure and offers no shortcuts a model could exploit to mimic effort without genuine search, providing firmer ground for empirical claims of shared effort. We find further evidence of alignment between LRM and human reasoning effort, as well as evidence that models and humans tend to make similar errors. Finally, we show that decoding methods that let models explore multiple reasoning paths increase alignment in reasoning cost between humans and LRMs across the three models tested.
Do neural models, such as Large Language Models, genuinely acquire compositional abilities for interpretation of natural language? When we talk about semantic interpretation, we can distinguish two complementary aspects: establishing what an expression refers to in the world (which we call the Extensional task) and representing its sense in a structured way (which we call the Intensional task). We evaluate LLMs and humans on both tasks in the setting of the Personal Relation Task (Paperno 2022) in which, given a universe of people and their relationships with each other, one is asked to interpret a noun phrase such as "Amber's parent's friend". Here, for the Intensional task, the answer is the formula "friend(parent(amber))", and for the Extensional task, the person. We find that humans and LLMs show opposite strengths: humans perform better on Extensional than Intensional tasks, and LLMs vice versa. Our methodology brings greater nuance to the understanding of compositional abilities in modern machine learning models. Our results support the notion that the lack of referential grounding in LLM training is a crucial missing component in mimicking human-like language understanding.