Resourced Authority A Mechanism-Design Model for Participatory Governance of Deployed AI Agents

AI agents increasingly work inside systems that govern how they delegate tasks, move information, execute actions, and use shared resources. Recent work already shows that deployment rules can change collective behavior. Here we ask which parts of an AI institution produce safety and how they do it. This is the first paper from POLIS, an ongoing research programme studying algorithmic institutions for multi-agent systems. We report a frozen 5,280-episode study suite. The main pre-specified delegation experiment spans four model families; a targeted high-conflict diagnostic adds three additional model endpoints. In matched structured workflows, the model sees different rule formulations and guards consult different authority states. We also vary the attractiveness of the immediate compliant internal/self fallback and allow blocked workflows to continue. A detailed constitutional prompt produces 0/384 realized violations. A provenance-aware executable guard also produces 0/384, although it blocks prohibited attempts in 51/384 episodes; 44/51 of those episodes later complete safely. The local-state guard's failures concentrate in scenarios where an ordinary transformation changes visible policy while originating authority stays fixed. In matched laundering scenarios, that guard admits violations in 22/96 episodes and provenance enforcement in 0/96 (p = 4.77 x 10^-7). A separate resource-allocation experiment shows that revealing the numerical value of an otherwise identical cap changes agent requests. In these structured workflows, the same final violation rate can hide very different mechanisms. The rule itself is only part of the institution. The authority state the system trusts matters, and so does the path available after a block.

The rapid deployment of autonomous AI agents across enterprise, healthcare, and safety-critical environments has created a fundamental governance gap. Existing approaches, runtime guardrails, training-time alignment, and post-hoc auditing treat governance as an external constraint rather than an internalized behavioral principle, leaving agents vulnerable to unsafe and irreversible actions. We address this gap by drawing on how humans self-govern naturally: before acting, humans engage deliberate cognitive processes grounded in executive function, inhibitory control, and internalized organizational rules to evaluate whether an intended action is permissible, requires modification, or demands escalation. This paper proposes a neurocognitive governance framework that formally maps this human self-governance process to LLM-driven agent reasoning, establishing a structural parallel between the human brain and the large language model as the cognitive core of an agent. We formalize a Pre-Action Governance Reasoning Loop (PAGRL) in which agents consult a four-layer governance rule set: global, workflow-specific, agent-specific, and situational before every consequential action, mirroring how human organizations structure compliance hierarchies across enterprise, department, and role levels. Implemented on a production-grade retail supply chain workflow, the framework achieves 95% compliance accuracy and zero false escalations to human oversight, demonstrating that embedding governance into agent reasoning produces more consistent, explainable, and auditable compliance than external enforcement. This work offers a principled foundation for autonomous AI agents that govern themselves the way humans do: not because rules are imposed upon them, but because deliberation is embedded in how they think.

Long-running AI agents create a control problem: each action they take changes the state, which in turn affects the trajectory of future actions. If the agent is not fully aligned, then guaranteeing safety requires approving consequential actions before allowing them to be executed. But requiring human approval at every step makes attention a bottleneck. Delegating review to other AI agents raises the same alignment problem: the reviewers may themselves be misaligned. We identify a condition on a reviewing panel that is weaker than individual alignment yet necessary and sufficient for a guarantee that the principal fares at least as well in expectation as under a designated baseline policy. Each reviewer agent reports whether an action proposal made by a proposer agent improves its own utility relative to the baseline. We show that a threshold rule tolerating $k$ disapprovals is safe exactly when, after any $k$ reviewers are removed, the principal's utility can be written as a nonnegative combination of the remaining reviewers' utilities, plus a term that is nonnegative on every feasible proposal. We call this property $k$-robust coalitional alignment. The characterization lifts to sequential control: in a discounted MDP with an arbitrary proposer agent, safety at every state is both necessary and sufficient for the induced policy to match or improve on the baseline. When reviewers vote strategically, full-panel coverage in reward-function space guarantees that every Nash equilibrium is safe under the unanimous approval rule; in contrast, more permissive thresholds can admit unsafe equilibria even when reviewers are individually aligned. Experiments with existing reviewer models show that collective review can remain sound without an aligned individual, even when some disapprovals are tolerated.