We study online cooperative control of a multi-agent system under Byzantine attacks. Namely, an unknown, fixed subset of agents are Byzantine comprised and can stealthily overwrite its own coordinates of the team's planned joint action after observing that plan. The learner observes planned actions, public rewards, and public states, but neither the overwrite nor the executed joint action. Our objective is security: to optimize the team performance against the worst overwrites and achieve the optimal security value. We first show that the attacker's information determines the geometry. An attacker that observes the planned action induces an exact (s,a)-rectangular robust Markov decision process (MDP) whose rows are convex hulls of overwrite-induced public-outcome laws, whereas a blind attacker induces an s-rectangular model. We then identify the information-theoretic limit of security learning, showing that the security regret decomposes exactly into return regret against the response generating the data and a cumulative response gap DK. Two indistinguishable horizon-one instances force Ω(K) expected security regret while return regret is zero, showing that dependence on DK is unavoidable. Finally, we develop a stage-tied robust estimation-to-decisions learner and prove a regret bound of O(H2SAK)+E[DK]. Our studies thus provide comprehensive theoretical and algorithmic foundations of reliable multi-agent systems under Byzantine attacks.
Learned communication improves coordination in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning, but it also creates a trust problem: a trained policy may route information through agents that have become faulty or adversarial. This paper studies Byzantine-agent detection for learned-communication MARL in adaptive traffic signal control. We propose BARD-MARL, a post-hoc diagnostic layer on top of BayesG, which is used as an attributed communication substrate rather than as a contribution of this paper. BARD-MARL combines two agent-level evidence streams: policy-graph features extracted from state-action trajectories and Bayesian trust statistics computed from BayesG latent mask probabilities. Across fixed-action, observation-flip, random-noise, and coordinated attacks in SUMO traffic grids, the results show that these signals are complementary rather than universally dominant. On a 25-agent grid, BARD-MARL reaches 0.843 AUC-ROC under a 10% observation-flip attack, while policy-graph-only detection reaches 0.917 AUC-ROC under a 10% coordinated attack. On a 100-agent grid, the unified BARD-MARL variant reaches 0.982 AUC-ROC for both 10% fixed-action and 10% coordinated attacks. The study shows that learned communication policies expose useful diagnostic evidence, but credible resilience claims require attack-specific ablations and explicit separation between coordination, detection, and mitigation.
We study distributed Byzantine-resilient actor-critic multi-agent reinforcement learning (AC-MARL), where agents collectively learn policies through local interactions. Existing methods guarantee convergence of the agents' parameters only to a neighborhood of the attack-free limit points, resulting in degraded performance. We propose Fully Resilient AC-MARL (FRAC-MARL), a decentralized method in which each agent leverages redundancy in two-hop messages to identify reliable messages. Under linear parameterizations of the value and team-reward functions and Byzantine edge attacks, where adversarial behavior is confined to the communication layer, we prove that agents' parameters converge almost surely to the same limit points as in the attack-free case over time-varying communication graphs. We introduce a novel topological condition for the convergence of our method, present a systematic method to construct such networks, and prove that this condition can be verified in polynomial time. Finally, we demonstrate our method on cooperative multi-robot formation control tasks.
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly collaborate over peer-to-peer networks to improve their reliability. However, these same interactions can also become a source of vulnerability, as unreliable or Byzantine agents may sway neighboring agents toward incorrect conclusions and degrade overall system performance. Existing methods rely on leader-based coordination or self-reported confidence, both of which are susceptible to adversarial manipulation. We study decentralized LLM multi-agent systems (LLM-MAS) and propose Self-Anchored Consensus (SAC), a fully decentralized iterative filter-and-refine protocol in which agents iteratively exchange responses, locally evaluate and filter unreliable messages, and refine their own outputs. We present (F+1)-robustness conditions for the communication graph that ensure honest agents preserve and propagate reliable information despite Byzantine influence. Experiments on mathematical and commonsense reasoning benchmarks show that SAC effectively suppresses Byzantine influence and consistently improves performance across diverse communication topologies, whereas prior methods degrade under adversarial conditions.