Persuasive and Compliant Tendencies Predict Group Decision-Making in Humans and Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as decision-making agents in high-stakes domains and as imitators of human behavior in the social and behavioral sciences. Yet how closely LLMs mirror human decision-making remains poorly understood. This gap is critical: misalignment could produce harmful outcomes in practice, while failure to replicate human behavior renders LLMs ineffective as social simulators. Here, we address this gap by replicating large-scale game-theoretic experiments and by introducing a systematic prompting and probing framework for machine-behavioral evaluation. We test three open models typically used to power agents (Llama, Mistral, and Qwen). Across 121 dyadic games spanning four classical game types, Llama reproduces human cooperation patterns with high fidelity, while Qwen aligns closely with Nash equilibrium predictions. Characterizing models through behavioral phenotyping, we find that humans and Llama share an envious decision profile, while Qwen and Mistral exhibit different profiles. An attention-based analysis of payoff salience reveals Llama processes payoff information in a structured, layer-dependent manner absent in Qwen and Mistral, suggesting a mechanistic basis for its closer alignment with human behavior. Population-level behavioral replication is achieved without persona-based prompting, simplifying the simulation process. Extending the experimental parameter space beyond the original human-tested games, we generate and preregister testable hypotheses for novel game configurations. Our findings demonstrate appropriately configured LLMs can replicate aggregate human behavioral patterns, exhibit human-like decision phenotypes, and enable systematic exploration of unexplored experimental spaces, offering a complementary approach to traditional behavioral research that generates new empirical predictions about human social decision-making.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as agents in simulations of social systems, yet it remains unclear when their behavior can be interpreted as a faithful proxy for human decision-making. Here we test LLM agents against a direct empirical benchmark: a large-scale networked Prisoner's Dilemma experiment with human participants. Using the same interaction protocol, payoff structure, and network topologies, we compare nine open-weight LLMs with the human data. The selected model reproduces several macro-level features of cooperation dynamics, including the early decline and later stabilization of cooperation. This aggregate agreement, however, does not extend uniformly to finer levels of behavior. LLM populations underestimate individual-level heterogeneity and generate conditional cooperation patterns that differ from those observed in humans. Adding a fraction of random agents improves some aspects of micro-level agreement, but does not remove the mismatch in decision rules. These findings reveal a macro--micro dissociation in LLM-based social agents: collective outcomes can appear human-like even when the underlying behavioral distributions and mechanisms are not. They suggest that validating LLM agents as human surrogates requires comparisons across aggregate dynamics, individual heterogeneity, and context-dependent decision rules, rather than outcome-level agreement alone.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate high-quality arguments, yet their ability to engage in nuanced and persuasive communicative actions remains largely unexplored. This work explores the persuasive potential of LLMs through the framework of Jürgen Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action. It examines whether LLMs express illocutionary intent (i.e., pragmatic functions of language such as conveying knowledge, building trust, or signaling similarity) in ways that are comparable to human communication. We simulate online discussions between opinion holders and LLMs using conversations from the persuasive subreddit ChangeMyView. We then compare the likelihood of illocutionary intents in human-written and LLM-generated counter-arguments, specifically those that successfully changed the original poster's view. We find that all three LLMs effectively convey illocutionary intent -- often more so than humans -- potentially increasing their anthropomorphism. Further, LLMs craft sycophantic responses that closely align with the opinion holder's intent, a strategy strongly associated with opinion change. Finally, crowd-sourced workers find LLM-generated counter-arguments more agreeable and consistently prefer them over human-written ones. These findings suggest that LLMs' persuasive power extends beyond merely generating high-quality arguments. On the contrary, training LLMs with human preferences effectively tunes them to mirror human communication patterns, particularly nuanced communicative actions, potentially increasing individuals' susceptibility to their influence.